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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
For some years after modem American conservative jurisprudence first
took shape in the 1970s and 1980s, both its proponents and its progressive
opponents acted as if progressives were Hertz and conservatives Avis.
Conservatives tried harder. Progressives took for granted their established
dominance of the arenas (judicial, political, and academic), and, especially, the
terms of constitutional debate. Not until around the turn of the twenty-first
century did progressives begin to acknowledge the seriousness of the
intellectual challenge from the right and to conjure strategies for responding. As
a spear-carrier in the Washington wars over the courts, I have participated in
this search for ways to argue about the Constitution and the courts that can be
persuasive in litigation as well as in political and public opinion arenas. In
major respects, these advocacy initiatives have been indispensably enriched by
the parallel, creative rethinking in process among progressive academics. Now
more than ever, progressive advocates need research and theory to handle a
rapidly shifting landscape of opportunities and, especially, threats. But
increasingly, the needs of progressive advocacy are not well served by
continued preoccupation with what the academic debate has mainly been about:
focus on supposedly "conservative" versus "progressive" methods of
constitutional interpretation--"originalism" versus the "living constitution," and
their respective revisions and refinements.
Progressive advocates-including, importantly, politicians and judges-
need strategies that accommodate five defining circumstances that currently
structure the politics of the courts and the Constitution:
First, to be credible with the majority of the electorate, arguments about the
Constitution, the law, or courts and judges must be couched in terms
harmonious with the civics class canon that guides most Americans' (and most
judges') expectations:
* Judges sit to apply law, not their own ideological preferences.
* In the first instance, the law is the actual words of the applicable statute,
regulation, decision, or constitutional provision.
* The original meaning of legal text is important in interpreting how to
apply the words to contemporary circumstances, though other factors
are also important, such as precedent and the practical consequences of
alternative interpretations.
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* Courts should show restraint and respect to legislatures, presidents, and
governors, who are democratically elected and responsible for making
policy and law.
Second, the politics of judicial nominations has been driven by a chronic
structural asymmetry that has favored the right. Social conservative voters place
a high enough priority on the federal courts to make credible to politicians the
threat that their votes could turn on that issue. In contrast, electoral
constituencies important to Democratic and moderate Republican candidates
give much lower priority to the courts. In a May 21, 2008, Rasmussen poll,
thirty percent of Republican respondents picked Supreme Court appointments
as the most important issue in their choice of a presidential candidate (more
than selected the Iraq war), compared with only seven percent of Democrats.1
While researching the 2005 Senate struggles over President George W. Bush's
two (actually three) Supreme Court nominations, I was told by the chief of staff
to one prominent red-state Democrat, "You'd be shocked at how many voters in
our state say that the Supreme Court is their highest priority issue." He was not
talking about moderate or liberal voters. Moderate independent and Democratic
voters, most of whom are more concerned about pocketbook issues than culture
war issues, have not seen the courts as important to their priority interests. This
structural imbalance is why, for much of the past two decades, Democratic
politicians have been tongue-tied when confronted with questions about the
Constitution and the courts-"flummoxed by anxiety that anything they say will
displease either court-focused liberal advocacy groups [with relatively little
electoral clout] or critical cultural conservative and independent...
constituencies." 2 Contrariwise, because a major bloc of Republican voters make
the courts a priority, so do Republican politicians; that is why the Reagan
Administration consciously seeded the courts of appeals with committed and
highly capable conservative nominees, why its Justice Department devoted
resources to generating a roadmap for rightward constitutional change, and why
President George W. Bush from the outset moved aggressively to showcase and
to fight for confirmation of provocatively conservative judicial nominees. 3
1 See For Republicans, Judicial Appointments Matter More than Iraq, RASMUSSEN
REP. (May 21, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/
elections/election_2008/2008_presidential election/for republicansjudicial-appointments_
matter-more than iraq.
2 Doug Kendall & Simon Lazarus, The Next War over the Courts, AM. PROSPECT, May
2009, at 30, 33, available at http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=thenext-war
over the courts.
3 See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on
Congressional Power. Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363
(2003) (detailing reports produced by Reagan's Justice Department specifying existing
Supreme Court precedents considered by the authors to have been wrongly decided, and
outlining the direction of corrective decisions). On May 11, 2001, in an unprecedented move
to highlight his political investment in judicial nominations, President Bush introduced his
first eleven appellate nominees to the media as a group in person. Neil A. Lewis, Bush to
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Third, the composition of the federal judiciary has a pronounced right-of-
center tilt, which is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Even if President
Obama wins a second term, the chances appear better than even that all five
members of the current Republican majority will be on the Court when his
successor takes office in January 2017. During his first two years in office, with
a 60-40 Democratic majority in the Senate, Obama was able to moderate the
substantial Republican imbalance at the federal appellate level left by President
George W. Bush. In January 2009, nine of the thirteen circuits had Republican
majorities, two were even, and two (the Second and Ninth) had Democratic
majorities. Two and one-half years later, Democrats held majorities on three
additional circuits (the Third, Fourth, and Federal) and the circuits on which
Republicans outnumbered Democrats had shrunk from nine to seven. 4 But of
course, going forward, Obama has a much slimmer Democratic Senate majority
in the current Congress. In 2012, the chances appear better than even that
Republicans will win the Senate. In sum, any progressive agenda aimed at
achieving actual outcomes in the federal judiciary will have to (a) focus
significantly on preserving established principles and precedents essential for
important progressive priorities, and (b) attempt, where possible, to frame issues
in terms that resonate with some members of the conservative majorities on the
judiciary, and especially, of course, on the Supreme Court.
Fourth, in the last year, conservatives have, at least for the moment, shifted
sharply rightward the thrust of their constitutional agenda and intensified the
aggressiveness with which they are pursuing it. They are no longer attacking
only, or mainly, the Warren Court, and incanting that "activist" justices will
create new "rights" important mainly to minorities or liberal "elites." The health
reform challenges take dead aim at the New Deal/Carolene Products footnote
four regime of judicial deference to legislatures on economic and social
regulation. 5 Mirroring the Tea Party insurrection within Republican political
ranks, libertarian legal theorists and advocates, who had been marginalized for
over a quarter century, have seized control of the conservative and Republican
constitutional agendas. Leading Republican politicians are emphasizing the
need for courts that will check "government overreach" (code for alleged
Nominate 11 to Judgeships Today, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2001, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/09/us/bush-to-nominate- 11 -to-judgeships-today.html.
High-decibel nomination struggles continued for the duration of Bush's two White House
terms.
4 Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nominations and Confirmations in the 111th Senate and
What to Look for in the 112th, BROOKINGS INST., 10-11 (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0104judicialnominationswheele
r/0104judicialnominationswheeler.pdf.
5See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (1938), in which the
Court famously prescribed that "regulatory legislation.., is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators," or where
the legislation violates individual rights that are "fundamental" under substantive due
process analysis, or protected by other constitutional provisions.
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expansions of federal power by the 111 th Congress, in particular the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act or ACA)), as much or
more than the old need to check judicial "activism" (code for Warren-Burger
Court individual rights decisions, in particular Roe v. Wade).
Fifth, moving in tandem with their right-shifted political allies, conservative
court-focused advocates (including movement conservative politicians and
judges) level new, potentially existential, threats to progressive values,
governance, and political viability (e.g., the new libertarian drive to reinstate
pre-New Deal constitutional barriers to economic regulatory legislation, a la
Lochner v. New York and its progeny, 6 the Tea Party's campaign to curtail
birthright citizenship, efforts to hamstring federal authority over and obstruct
individual enforceability of benefit entitlements, Republican determination to
disenfranchise progressive constituencies, conservative politicians' and judges'
increasingly bold ambitions for stretching the First Amendment to entrench
corporate political power).
All of the above features of the current state of constitutional conflict
militate in favor of progressives' turning away from arguing about how to argue
about what the Constitution means and turning toward arguing directly why the
Constitution supports progressive positions on the major issues of the day. Even
viewed on its own terms, the long-running academic debate about interpretive
methodology appears to have little if any substance left to it, as University of
Virginia Law Professor Jim Ryan chronicles. 7 Substantially all progressive
academics and, indeed, substantially all conservative academics now commonly
acknowledge (1) that the initial, "original intent" or "expectations" version of
originalism is untenable; (2) that, on the other hand, text and "original meaning"
6 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which a 5-4 majority held that
maximum hours legislation violated a principle of "freedom of contract," resident in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition on governmental deprivation of "liberty"
without "due process of law," launched and gave its name to the "Lochner Era." See id. at
64. During this 30-year period, the Supreme Court applied this muscular concept of
"substantive due process," as well as other envelope-pushing doctrinal inventions, to block
state and federal economic regulatory legislation. "Lochnerism" was repudiated by Supreme
Court decisions in 1937 through the early 1940s, and replaced by the principles of judicial
restraint and deference famously articulated in footnote four of the Carolene Products
decision. See 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Footnote four and its condemnation of Lochnerian
activism was a staple of mainstream conservative jurisprudence, in conflict with libertarian
jurisprudence. See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1986),
which contains chapters titled "The Framers of the Constitution v. Judge Bork," "The
Majoritarian Myth," and "Principled Judicial Activism." The history of conflict between
libertarian and mainstream conservative legal thought leaders is elaborated in Damon W.
Root, Conservatives v. Libertarians: The Debate over Judicial Activism Divides Former
Allies, REASON, July 2010, at 25. See also Doug Kendall & Glenn Sugameli, Cmty. Rights
Counsel & Earth Justice, Janice Rogers Brown and the Environment: A Dangerous Choice
for a Critical Court, COMMUNITY RTS. CouNs., 2, 8 (Oct. 21, 2003),
http://www.communityrights.org/PDFs/BrownReport.pdf.
7 James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism,
97 VA. L. REv. 1523 (2011).
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of constitutional provisions are important, though not exclusive, components of
constitutional interpretation; and (3) that, whatever "original meaning" means,
other factors, including precedent and evolving circumstances, are appropriate
considerations for judges to factor into decisions. 8 Differences over such
methodological issues have narrowed and no longer necessarily correspond to
left-right political or ideological divisions among progressives or even between
progressives and conservatives.
To meet the new challenges of political debate over the Constitution,
progressive politicians, justices, and, increasingly, court-focused progressive
advocates are turning to three approaches: first, emphasizing the threat posed by
conservative pro-corporate judicial "activism" to basic, mainly "pocketbook"
needs of "ordinary people"; second, stressing fidelity to the Constitution and
democratically enacted laws, and grounding arguments in the content and
original meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions (an approach also
consistent with branding conservatives as "activist" for their selective infidelity
to these basics of the civics class canon); and, third, detailing the drastic real-
world consequences of conservative and libertarian constitutional (or statutory)
interpretations. For example, President Obama's rhetoric has significantly
embraced these approaches. He has noted that "we are all constitutionalists."9
He has stressed that appreciation of the impact of the courts on everyday
concerns is a prime criterion for picking judicial nominees and prominently
attacked the Roberts Court's Lilly Ledbetteri° and Citizens United11 decisions.12
The White House's approach was partly inspired by Senate Judiciary
Committee Democrats. Beginning in 2008, Chair Patrick Leahy and his
colleagues have, in oversight and legislative hearings, floor statements, and
during judicial confirmation proceedings, repeatedly attacked the Rehnquist and
Roberts Supreme Courts for systematically gutting laws enacted to remedy
abuses related to consumer credit, retirement security, employment
discrimination, health care, and similar needs, "sometimes turning these laws on
their heads and making them protections for big business rather than for
ordinary citizens." 13 Similarly, the Administration and other advocates
defending the constitutionality of the 2010 Affordable Care Act have
emphasized that prescribing broad and effective authority to regulate the
national economy was a priority objective of the Framers, as confirmed by the
8 1d. at 1525-26.
9 BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 88 (2006).
10 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
11 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
12 See infra Parts II.A.2-4.
13 Short-Change for Consumers and Short-Shrift for Congress? The Supreme Court's
Treatment of Laws that Protect Americans' Health, Safety, Jobs and Retirement: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I I0th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Short-Change]
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_senatehearings&docid
=f:44331 .pdf.
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foundational interpretations of their contemporary, Chief Justice John
Marshall.14
This Article will outline, from an advocate's perspective, the recent
evolution of progressives' approaches to promoting their vision of the
Constitution and the role of the courts, in academic circles and in real-world
litigation, governmental, and media arenas. It will identify what I see as the
principal new strategies that progressive advocates have rolled out to counter
the apparently comparative effectiveness, and increasingly reactionary and
radical agenda, of conservatives. Finally, the Article will offer suggestions as to
how progressives should refine and deploy these new strategies to maximize
their impact.
II. PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ACADEMY: AN
ADVOCATE'S TAKE ON WHERE WE ARE AND How WE GOT HERE
Among progressive academics, a principal focus of efforts to respond to
conservatives' drive to capture control of the courts and the constitutional
agenda has been to develop a distinctive "progressive constitutionalism,"
sometimes called a progressive "vision" of the Constitution, "constitutional
fidelity," "democratic constitutionalism," or other similar labels.i 5 This quest
was conceived as a reaction to "originalism," the principal theoretical
component of conservatives' constitutional credo. 16 At its inception, originalism
was cast by its architects, Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Edwin Meese, and their
lieutenants, as itself a reaction to progressives' concept of a "living
Constitution." 17 Both sides saw originalism as a philosophical basis for
14 See Brief for Appellant, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th
Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058), 2011 WL 686279, at *19; Brief of Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, Urging Affirmance at 8-
9, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388), 2011 WL
1653749, at *8-9 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005)). 1 elaborated this point in
an issue brief for the American Constitution Society. See Simon Lazarus, The Health Care
Lawsuits: Unraveling a Century of Constitutional Law and the Fabric of Modern American
Government, AM. CONST. Soc'Y, 2, 4-7 (Feb. 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/
default/files/lazarus_-_health reform_lawsuits_0.pdf; see also Brief of Amici Curiae State
Legislators in Support of Defendants-Appellants, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v.
Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235 (11 th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011
WL 1461595.
15 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and
Backlash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 374 (2007).
16 See generally Ryan, supra note 7, at 1529.
17 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971); Edwin Meese, III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5, 5-6 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 41-47 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997).
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opposing the Warren Court's expansion of individual constitutional rights via
the argument that the "original" Constitution provided no sanction for the
Court's aggressively crafted safeguards for criminal procedure, gender
discrimination, privacy, religious autonomy, racial balance, and other areas of
controversy. Likewise, both sides saw the living Constitution-the idea that the
meaning of the Constitution could change in response to changing
circumstances-as a formula for defending, and, indeed, extending the Warren
Court's jurisprudence. 18 For conservatives, originalism was consistent with and
complementary to themes they repeatedly struck in their political advocacy
about the courts and the Constitution-support for "strict construction" and
aversion to "activist" judges who "legislate from the bench." Progressives
tended not so much to deny all these critiques as to ignore them, or dismiss
them as subterfuges--"just a form of name-calling, a dirty word for judges who
issue decisions that the speaker does not like."' 9
A. Progressive Critics Score; Academic Originalists Retreat;
Conservative Advocates Advance
No doubt, progressives' disdain for their upstart challengers was reinforced
by devastating criticisms made early-on by academic critics of originalism-
most but not all of them progressives. These critics scored three related, and
significant, points. First, they demonstrated that the interpretations that the
Framers "intended" to attach to disputed constitutional provisions, despite the
abundance of evidence from the records of the Constitutional Convention and
otherwise, were often for all intents and purposes unknowable and at best a
weak reed for applying the Constitution to specific cases involving modem
conditions. 20 Second, scholars showed, on the basis of both the broad and
malleable terms written into the Constitution and its drafting and ratification
history, that the Framers themselves did not intend the meaning of the document
to be limited by contemporaneous late eighteenth-century societal practices.
Hence, to respect the intent of the Framers meant to allow interpretations of
their work to evolve as historical circumstances changed. 21 Hence, these
scholars noted, it is appropriate and consistent with honoring the constitutional
18 Ryan notes that by "suggesting that landmark decisions [like Brown v. Board of
Education and Roe v. Wade] ... could not be squared with the original meaning of the
Constitution, these [progressive] critics essentially conceded that conservatives were correct
in charging that the Warren Court had gone beyond the Constitution." Ryan, supra note 7, at
1536.
19 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT-WING JUSTICE: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE
OVER THE COURTS 148 (2004).
20 A leading exponent of this widespread criticism was Paul Brest. See, e.g., Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 234-37 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
21 The principal exponent of this point was H. Jefferson Powell. See H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985).
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text and the original understanding for judges to give weight to the practical
consequences of differing potential interpretations of its provisions.22 Third, for
those reasons and because neither drafters' (nor ratifiers') subjective intentions
nor external circumstances could legitimately trump the constitutional text
itself, originalism--defined as original "intent" or original "expected
application originalism"--appeared insupportable as a legitimate interpretive
methodology, whatever one's political leanings. 23
Among academic proponents of originalism-in particular, their most noted
public champion, Justice Antonin Scalia-these criticisms struck home. They
modified the "original intent" formulation initially put forward by Robert Bork,
Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese, and Scalia himself. They replaced this
with a revision-"original meaning" originalism. The precise meaning of this
new mantra was, and remains, something of a moving target, and different
adherents endorse differing versions, or emphases. But in general, originalism
2.0 connoted the original text of whatever constitutional provision is at issue,
"objectively" understood as contemporaneous society-drafters, ratifiers,
observers-would have understood it, not as drafters subjectively "intended"--
nor, to be sure, as later generations might understand its meaning however
many decades or centuries later.24 As the debate continued, academic
conservative originalists fashioned versions 2.1, 2.2, etcetera. These further
revisions acknowledge that major constitutional provisions are very broad and
abstract, susceptible of differing interpretations and, specifically, susceptible to
evolving interpretations as time progresses and circumstances change. 25
This shift toward moderation by academic originalists did not dampen the
militancy of conservative political constituencies and advocates, which steadily
increased during the last decades of the twentieth century, nor did it soften their
rhetoric. 26 Nor did these concessions diffuse the passionate anti-originalist
22 Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1990).
23 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note
17, at 5-27.
24 The process by which proponents of the "Doctrine of Original Intent" acknowledged
the force of progressive criticisms and substituted a new "Doctrine of Original Meaning" is
described in, among other sources, Ryan, supra note 7, and an entry on University of Illinois
Law and Philosophy Professor Lawrence B. Solum's blog. See Legal Theory Lexicon 019:
Originalism, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal-theorylexicon/
2004/01/legal theoryle-l.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2010).
25 Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 665 (2009).
26 The steady rightward shift and increasing militancy of Senate Republicans on matters
relating to the courts, beginning in the early 1990s and continuing through President George
W. Bush's first term, is detailed in SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 131-272. The history is
updated through the Sotomayor nomination and further analyzed in Simon Lazarus, Don't
Blame Democrats for Republican Obstruction of Obama's Judicial Nominees, ROLL CALL
(June 25, 2009, 6:24 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/-36303-I.html, and Kendall &
Lazarus, supra note 2.
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intensity of many progressive academics. 27 What ardent anti-originalists did
notice was that, outside the academy, their logically compelling criticisms
seemed to fall flat. By the turn of the twenty-first century, Republican
politicians grew increasingly aggressive, and successful, at mobilizing support
for highly ideological federal judicial nominees and stonewalling Democratic
nominees.28 Increasingly, progressives recognized that the living Constitution
had failed as a useable banner in this escalating war over the courts. On the
political and public opinion side, conservatives had ruined the living
Constitution brand by successfully equating it with a penchant for "making it up
as we go along," i.e., an excuse for unprincipled judicial activism driven by
judges' (liberal) political and policy preferences. 29 Sounding a lament common
among progressives in and out of the academy, Yale's Robert Post and Reva
Siegel wrote in 2006, "Originalism remains even now a powerful vehicle for
conservative mobilization. ' 30 Explaining progressives' predicament, William
Forbath observed in 2010 that, whereas conservatives invoke the Framers'
"original understanding" when they strike down a law, "[w]hen liberal judges
strike down a law, they are 'making up' new law... [and] [b]etraying the
Founding Fathers."31
B. Progressive Responses: Living Constitution Lite and Progressive
Originalism
To respond to this discouraging situation, some progressive thinkers and
advocates set to work developing new approaches designed to satisfy dual
prerequisites: avoid conservatives' line of attack on "activist" liberal
jurisprudence, but at the same time avoid any appearance of embracing their
adversaries' "originalism" credo. These approaches tended to emphasize that
the major provisions of the Constitution established enduring principles; but,
applying these constant principles to changing historical circumstances does not
necessarily require inquiry into or deference to the "original meaning" of the
constitutional text-the principles that the Framers or ratifiers would have
27 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice. The
Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 545 (2006).
28 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29 Edward Whelan, Op-Ed., Judicial Activism Awards Fixed!, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 24,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-whelan24oct24,0,3706916.story?coll
=la-opinion-center; Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Strongly Opposes
Nomination of Goodwin Liu to Ninth Circuit (May 19, 2011), available at
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=2635d4dd- 104c-4061 -bd9b-
3073896f5d43.
30 Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 546.
31 William Forbath, Op-Ed., The Framers and Us: How Not to Use History to Argue
About the Constitution and the Supreme Court, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/WilliamForbath_4987AC64-32A8-47E9-BF 15-
E469DB520F5D.html.
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perceived in the text. Hence, approaches plying this vein of progressive
constitutionalism drop the discredited label, "living Constitution," and
acknowledge that there is something significant--"principles" or "values"-
underlying the text to which judges must refer for guidance. But they retain, if
in more qualified terms, the spin of vintage living constitutionalists, that the
heavy lifting in constitutional interpretation falls to interpretation itself, and that
its interpreters, i.e., judges, are appropriately driven by considerations
independent of the text and the original understanding.32
Other progressive academics, however, disclaimed interest in fashioning
new "living Constitution lite" approaches. In the 2000 edition of his treatise,
American Constitutional Law, Laurence Tribe noted that several identifiable
modes of interpretation recur in constitutional adjudication, and that "[n]o one
mode... can claim always to take priority or to be necessarily decisive. '33 But,
Tribe wrote, among these approaches, "text is paramount," is a circumstance
that is "inevitable if the Constitution is to be seriously regarded as law-and
seems invulnerable to major objection provided one does not pretend that the
text answers all questions of meaning." 34 Further, Tribe stressed that, while the
original interpretation (i.e., meaning) of the text is not necessarily controlling,
the "burden of justification" must rest on those who contend that a "changed
meaning" is warranted by intervening developments. 35 Tribe concludes that
"[t]o the degree that original meaning would at least establish a baseline and
create a presumption to be overcome, its gravitational pull remains
undeniable."'36
Other progressive scholars took Tribe's acknowledgement of the
"inescapability of a moderate originalism" a step further. They operationalized
it. In several articles and in particular a 2005 book, America's Constitution: A
Biography, Akhil Amar demonstrated that the constitutional text, and the
original meaning of the text, in fact provide compelling support for progressive
positions. Amar challenged the largely unquestioned libertarian originalist
precept that the 1789 Constitution was incompatible with modern activist
federal domestic government and international leadership. He also stressed the
32 See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, The Only Way Liberals Can Compete in
Constitutional Interpretation, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 18, 2007),
http://www.tnr.com/article/liberal-originalism. In a recent debate with progressive
originalists (or in their own terminology, "new textualists"), Doug Kendall, Jim Ryan,
Geoffrey Stone, and William Marshall acknowledged that the Framers' "values, concerns,
and purposes, as reflected in the text of the Constitution, must inform and guide the process
of constitutional interpretation, but.., as a set of general principles and aspirations." See
Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, The Framers' Constitution, DEMOCRACY: J.
IDEAS, Summer 2011, at 59, 61, 65 (emphasis added), available at
http://www.democracyjoumal.org/pdf/2 1/ the framersconstitution.pdf.
33 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (3d ed. 2000).
341d.
3 51d. at 49.
3 6 1d. at 52.
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obvious point, which conservative originalists had often been wont to overlook,
that the Constitution includes the Bill of Rights, Reconstruction, and
Progressive Era Amendments; especially when original meaning is emphasized,
all of these shift the thrust of the overall document leftwards in major
respects.37
Amar's pioneering work was further developed by his Yale colleague Jack
Balkin. Drilling deeply into the historical record, Jack Balkin refuted the line
repeated incessantly by Justice Clarence Thomas and fellow libertarians that the
Framers and their contemporaries understood "interstate commerce" as nothing
broader than "trade," hence at odds with the post-New Deal empowerment of
Congress to reach all matters necessary to regulate the national economy.
38
Balkin has also offered an ingenious and extensively researched originalist
argument for retaining Fourteenth Amendment protection for abortion, 39 an
originalist analysis integrating the three Reconstruction Amendments that yields
a far more extensive scope to their substantive and enforcement reach than
prescribed by Supreme Court precedents,40 and a theoretical framework for
melding originalism and living constitutionalism that emphasizes evolutionary
realization of ideals embedded in the constitutional text and original meaning.41
Complementing and reinforcing the work of Amar and Balkin is a 2003
book, relatively unnoticed as yet in American legal circles, by Swedish historian
Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government. Edling elaborately
documents his thesis-reinforcing Amar's similar conclusion-that the
Federalists' priority, well understood and articulated by both sides in the
ratification debate, was "to create a strong national state in America, a state
possessing all the significant powers held by contemporary European states"
(i.e., plenary power to tax, spend, conduct foreign affairs, raise armies, declare
war, and regulate national and international economic affairs).42
3 7 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 474-76 (2005).
38 Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2010).
39 Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292-95
(2007).
4 0 Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1801-02
(2010).
41 Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 428 (2007). Balkin's redemption concept closely resembles the
transcendentalist notion, characterized by Garry Wills as the driving force behind Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address that the United States could evolve to realize in practice the core values
reflected in its founding documents, effectively, in the Address, reading the Declaration of
Independence into the Constitution. GARRY T. WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE
WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 104-47 (1993).
42 MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 4 (2003). Although, to
my knowledge, Edling's work has not been incorporated in the work of American
constitutional scholars or advocates, eminent American historians have recognized it as, in
the words of Gordon Wood on the Edling volume's back cover, "a powerfully argued
revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Constitution," and by Jack Rakove as one of
six noteworthy books on the framing of the Constitution (along with Wood's Creation of the
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Other scholars have exhaustively researched the original meaning of
constitutional provisions at issue in major contemporary controversies,
including congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
affirmative action, substantive application of the due process clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, and the Second Amendment. Their work
shows that contemporary conservative positions on these issues have highly
controvertible, or, more often, transparently flimsy connections to the actual
text of the Constitution, as well as to the understandings and purposes that
drove those who drafted and ratified them.43
Debate over these issues generated a truly vast literature in the past decade.
In some quarters, passions invested in particular positions or by particular
scholars continued to run high.an But it would seem long past time for this ardor
to cool, and, indeed, for the debate itself to close. From the standpoint of an
outside observer, there is nothing there. Substantially all progressive academics
and, indeed, substantially all conservative academics now commonly
acknowledge (1) that the initial, "original intent" version of originalism is
untenable; (2) that, on the other hand, text and "original meaning" of
constitutional provisions are important, though not exclusive, components of
constitutional interpretation; and (3) that, whatever "original meaning" means,
other factors, including precedent and evolving circumstances, mores, and the
consequences of alternative interpretations are often relevant to applying
specific provisions to contemporary issues.45  Differences over such
methodological issues have narrowed and no longer necessarily correspond to
left-right political or ideological divisions among progressives or even between
progressives and conservatives.46
American Republic and Rakove's own Original Meanings). Interview by Eve Gerber with
Jack Rakove (July 4, 2011), available at http://thebrowser.com/interviews/jack-rakove-on-
us-constitution.
43Applications of originalist types of arguments to support progressive results in
specific subject-matter areas are collected and reviewed by Ryan, supra note 7, at 1527-28,
1545-46.
441n 2007, Yale professors Reva Siegel and Robert Post (now Dean of Yale Law
School), while recognizing that "Liberals do need to re-learn how to make claims directly on
the Constitution," nevertheless equated progressive efforts to "reclaim the Constitution and
profess fidelity to its text and original meaning" with "the right seem[ing] to have won the
battle of constitutional theory." Post & Siegel, supra note 32. In the same vein, they counsel
rejection of "a method of interpretation that strongly privileges the history of constitutional
lawmaking over the experience of living under the Constitution," and "shackle[s]
[progressives] to the constitutional understandings of the nineteenth century." Id.
4 5 An especially lucid and comprehensive canvass of the academic originalism-"living
Constitution" debate has recently been published in the form of a debate between originalist
Illinois University Law Professor Lawrence B. Solum and living constitutionalist
Northwestern University Professor (and former Dean) Robert W. Bennett. See ROBERT W.
BENNETr & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE (2011).
46 For example, in an American Constitution Society-sponsored 2009 volume designed
to outline a consensus progressive approach to constitutional interpretation characterized as
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III. PROGRESSIVE ADVOCACY ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
COURTS
During the last three decades, while the academic wars over originalism
raged, and while real-world conservative advocates, politicians, and judges
never missed an opportunity to trumpet their fealty to the "original"
Constitution, the Framers' intent, "strict construction," and "judges who do not
legislate from the bench," their real-world progressive adversaries were all but
mute on these issues. Progressive advocates (including politicians and judges)
steered clear of discussing, let alone embracing, any overarching constitutional
vision or philosophy. Their affirmative advocacy about the courts focused
principally on specific results they wished to secure, usually framed as "rights,"
targeted at particular constituencies, e.g., women, people with disabilities, or
racial or ethnic minorities. Their response to the incessant din of conservative
complaints about "liberal activist judges" was either to dismiss the charge as
irrelevant, politically motivated, simply a convenient epithet for attacking
persons or decisions with which conservatives disagree, or, more often, to
remain silent. In significant part, progressives' skittishness stemmed from
politicians' perceptions, reinforced by poll results, that conservatives' messages
about the Constitution and the courts were popular. In a January 2009
Rasmussen poll, 64% of independents and 52% of Democrats agreed that
Supreme Court decisions should be "guided by what's written in the
Constitution," as opposed to "fairness and justice" (as, predictably, did 79% of
Republicans). 47 Unsurprisingly, progressives' diffidence left the public with no
counter to conservative charges that progressives' infatuation with a "living
Constitution" meant that Democratic appointees to the federal bench would be
prone to ignore the law and "make it up as they go along"; the same poll
showed that only 35% of the electorate expected then-candidate Obama to
nominate judges who would follow the written Constitution. 48
To fill this void, in the past few years, progressive advocates, politicians,
and judges have identified and begun to deploy three strategies for
strengthening the progressive voice in the wars over the courts and the
Constitution.
"constitutional fidelity," co-authors Goodwin Liu, Pamela Karlan, and Christopher
Schroeder state that:
[Olur view of constitutional fidelity is not at odds with originalism if originalism is
understood to mean a commitment to the underlying principles that the Framers' words
were publicly understood to convey, as opposed to the Framers' expectations of how
those principles would have applied at the time they were adopted.
GOODwIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH wiTH
THE CONSTITUTION 35 (2009).
47 Kendall & Lazarus, supra note 2, at 35.
4 81d.
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A. Don 't-Twist-the-Law-to-Favor-the-Big-Guy
1. Senate Judiciary Democrats Develop the Message
In June 2008, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Patrick Leahy launched a
series of oversight hearings stretching over three years, designed, as he stated in
his opening statement, "to shine a light on how the Supreme Court's decisions
affect Americans' everyday lives." 49 Noting that, especially in today's
distressed economy, citizens are preoccupied with health care coverage,
retirement uncertainty, and credit card, home mortgage, and other monthly
payments, Leahy observed, "Congress has passed laws to protect Americans
in... these areas, but in many cases, the Supreme Court... has ignored the
intent of Congress." 50 Indeed, for the previous three decades, the Court's
hostility to consumer, employee, retiree, and other statutory protections,
particularly to individual suits to enforce them, had been a secret hiding in plain
sight. During that period, in which Republican presidents selected twelve
Supreme Court justices and Democrats managed only two, business community
advocates had repeatedly asked the Court to narrow or neutralize laws enacted
by progressive Congressional majorities. "Oftentimes," as Leahy said, the
conservative majorities on the Court had "turn[ed] these laws on their heads and
ma[de] them protections for big business rather than for ordinary citizens." 51
Leahy's hearings hosted numerous "ordinary citizens" and experts who
bore compelling witness to the validity of his opening critique. Some examples:
A 44-year-old Pennsylvania lupus patient testified on June 11, 2008,
that the insurer to which her husband's employer had transferred his
family coverage interrupted her treatment and for months stonewalled
her requests to resume it, causing septic shock that resulted in
amputation of her right foot and five fingers; reluctantly, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that the Supreme Court's "unjust
and increasingly tangled" interpretation of the 1974 federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) barred any monetary
compensatory relief, and, further, that ERISA preempted claims for
compensation under state negligence and trust law.52
4 9 Short-Change, supra note 13, at 1 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
501d.
51 Id.
52 1d. at 8-10. Yale Professor John Langbein dissects the Supreme Court majority's
ERISA jurisprudence in John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The
Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLuM. L. REv.
1317 (2003). Numerous justices and judges have condemned what Justice Ginsburg decried
as the "regulatory vacuum" resulting from the Court's one-two punch of "an encompassing
interpretation of ERISA's preemptive force [and] a cramped construction of the 'equitable
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* On July 23, 2008, representatives of the 32,000 fishermen whose
livelihoods were destroyed by the 1989 Exxon-Valdez oil spill off the
Alaskan coast testified on the impact of the Court's end-of-term
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, in which a 5-3 majority
slashed damages from $2.5 billion to $500 million overall, i.e., from
$75,000 to $15,000 apiece-far less than needed to cover the actual
economic devastation wrought by the spill. 53 Four of the justices would
have barred any punitive damages at all against Exxon. As Justice
Stephen Breyer noted in his dissent, "[T]his was no mine-run case of
reckless behavior," but a matter in which "Exxon knowingly allowed a
relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with millions of
gallons of oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many
plaintiffs in this case." 54
* On several occasions, the Judiciary Committee and the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions targeted the June
18, 2009, 5-4 decision, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., which
radically weakened long-standing standards for protecting employees
against discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) and numerous other antidiscrimination laws. 55 The
decision held that a victim of age discrimination, in order to prevail in
court, must prove that unlawful bias was the "but-for" cause of adverse
treatment-often tantamount to having to show that it was the exclusive
factor in the adverse decision.56 As a practical matter, especially since
employers create paper trails purporting to justify adverse actions on
legitimate business-related grounds, this is a standard that is in most
cases literally impossible to meet. In effect, the 5-4 Gross majority
relieved employers of virtually all legal risk for discriminating against
older workers, so long as they do not actually state that they are
singling out employees for adverse treatment solely because of age.
" The Judiciary Committee has repeatedly spotlighted the conservative
majority's broadening conversion of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act
from a limited endorsement of business-to-business consensual
commercial arbitration agreements into a tool empowering businesses
to shield themselves from liability for violating virtually all federal and
relief allowable under [the federal statute]." See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200,
222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
53Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on Corporate
Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4-6 (2008) [hereinafter Courting Big Business] (statement of Osa M.
Schultz), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110
senatehearings&docid=f:48144.pdf.
54 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 525 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
561d. at 235 1.
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state laws protecting consumers, employees, retirees, depositors,
beneficiaries, and other dependent individuals. At a July 23, 2008,
hearing, Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet testified that, of all
the legislative fixes that Congress might consider to correct Supreme
Court decisions that weakened workplace antidiscrimination
protections, none would have more impact than to reverse the Court's
expansion of the FAA to preempt state laws protecting individual
employees from binding mandatory agreements waiving their right to
seek court redress for violations of federal or state statutory rights. 57 In
April 2011, Judiciary Committee members Al Franken of Minnesota
and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut attacked the most recent
extension of the Court's forced arbitration jurisprudence, the AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion decision that preempted a California
statute barring consumer sales agreements with fine print provisos
requiring all consumer legal claims to be handled through arbitration
mechanisms on a one-by-one basis with no collective or class
challenges. 58
On June 29, 2011, Senator Leahy chaired a hearing to "highlight"
Supreme Court decisions at the end of the 2010-2011 term that gave
"corporations additional power to act in their own self-interest. '59 In
addition to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the hearing targeted
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, in which "the
same five justices gave corporations another victory by shielding them
from accountability even when they knowingly lied to their
investors"--a "license to lie" and a "roadmap for fraud," as Leahy
said.60 The hearing also examined Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, in
which the conservative bloc held that a large corporation could not be
subjected to an employment discrimination class action by employees
from different units or branches, as long as the company maintained a
written nondiscrimination policy and delegated payment decisions to
57Courting Big Business, supra note 53, at 9 (statement of Elizabeth Bartholet,
Professor, Harvard Law School).5 8 Press Release, Senator Al Franken, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson
Announce Legislation Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts Against Corporations
(Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://franken.senate.gov/?p+press-release&id- 1466.
59Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court's Recent Rulings
Will Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
1 (2011) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint= 1 &id=3d9031 b47812
de2592c3baeba6O7fb62&wit id=3d9031 b47812de2592c3baeba607fb62-0-1.
60 Id.
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the units or branches-making it "harder to hold corporations
accountable under our historic civil rights laws."61
2. Progressives Overturn the Court's Evisceration of Equal Pay
Opportunity Guarantees in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Several of the Senate Judiciary Committee's oversight hearings on judicial
favoritism for corporate interests over consumers featured the Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. decision, which achieved widespread notoriety as
soon as it was handed down on May 29, 2007.62 The case was brought by Lilly
Ledbetter, a supervisor at a Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. plant in Gadsden,
Alabama, from 1979 to 1998. When she retired, Ledbetter was tipped off by a
co-worker that, throughout her career, she had received lower pay than her male
counterparts performing identical work. The Supreme Court reversed a jury
verdict in favor of Ledbetter. The familiar 5-4 majority held that her suit was
barred by the Title VII statute of limitations provision, which requires workers
to file suit within 180 days after the last act they allege to be discriminatory.
Ledbetter had contended that her most recent paychecks were part of a chain of
acts which flowed from and were infected by the original company decisions to
give her second-class status. The Court's decision to the contrary-that the
initial discriminatory decision was also the last discriminatory act within the
meaning of the statute-as Justice Ginsburg noted in the dissent she read from
the bench, "grandfathered" the sexist practices that side-tracked Ledbetter's
career, and made the seminal injustice "afait accompli beyond the province of
Title VII ever to repair." 63 Like Ledbetter, employees typically learn of pay
discrimination only by happenstance and long after the decisions that triggered
their persistent mistreatment. In effect, the majority's reading rendered the
substantive equal pay opportunity guarantee of Title VII unenforceable by, and
useless to, the discrimination victims the law was enacted to protect. 64
Spurred by progressive advocates, the House of Representatives passed a
legislative "fix" bill barely two months after the Ledbetter decision came down.
In April 2008, an attempt to break a Senate filibuster against the bill produced
fifty-seven affirmative votes-three short of the sixty needed to prevail but,
significantly, including six Republicans, who evidently were more concerned
about retribution from women constituents than from their party leadership.65
6 11d.; see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); Janus Capital
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
62 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
6 31d. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 4 Id. at 643-60.
65 Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/washington/
24cong.html. Before the final tally, Majority Leader Harry Reid switched his vote to
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Democratic presidential front-runner Barack Obama took note of the
surprisingly broad appeal of this case about an obscure female factory worker
over an impenetrable question of legal procedure. He arranged for her to speak
to the Democratic National Convention at which he received the party's
nomination for the presidency, declared that enacting the legislation to overturn
the case would be an early priority for an Obama Administration, conspicuously
placed her with him on the train on which he traveled from Philadelphia to
Washington, D.C. for his inauguration, and seated her among his cadre of
special guests for his first address to a joint session of Congress. 66 One week
after the inauguration, Obama made the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration
Act the first bill he signed into law as President in a triumphal East Room
signing ceremony, the bill having passed the Senate 61-36 with five Republican
votes.67
Initially, Obama narrowly cast the Ledbetter case as a gender issue, targeted
at women voters. 68 But over the course of the ensuing year, he and his
strategists broadened the message. In a May 2009 C-SPAN interview, weeks
before announcing his nomination of Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor to
replace retiring Justice David Souter, Obama said he was looking for a judge
who had "not only the intellect to ... apply the law to cases," but "a sense of
how American society works and how the American people live," the ability "to
stand in somebody else's shoes and see through their eyes and get a sense of
how the law might work or not work in practical day-to-day living." 69 Obama
cited the Ledbetter case as an example, because he thought that "anybody who
has ever worked in a job like [Lilly Ledbetter's] understands that they might not
know that they were being discriminated against .... It doesn't make sense for
their rights to be foreclosed." '70
negative to enable him to move to reconsider the motion at a later date consistent with
applicable parliamentary rules; hence, the official final tally was 56-44 in favor of cloture.
Senate Republicans Block Unequal Pay Bill, CNN (Apr. 23, 2008),
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-04-23/politics/senate.discrimination 1lilly-ledbetter-majority-
leader-harry-reid-senate-republicans?_s=PM:POLITICS.
6 6 Michael Falcone, Guests of the First Lady, Reflecting Main Themes of the Speech,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/us/
politics/25guests.html; Obama Touts Equal-Pay Bill at Signing Ceremony, MSNBC (Jan.
29, 2009, 8:08 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28910789/ns/politics-whitehouse/t/
obama-touts-equal-pay-bill-signing-ceremony/.
67 Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady's Hand in It, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2009, at Cl, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/
29/AR2009012901887.html?hpid=topnews.
68 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
69 Interview by Steve Scully, C-SPAN, with Barack H. Obama, President (May 22,
2009), available at http://www.cspan.org/pdf/obamainterview.pdf
701d.
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3. Citizens United Ratchets Up the Stakes
In January 2010, the conservative justices gave the Obama White House
team, which in their first months in office declared themselves "eager" to defuse
the political war over the courts and the Constitution, a brusque push toward
ratcheting up their critique of the Roberts Court. On January 10, the familiar 5-
4 split yielded the Citizens United decision, holding that corporations were
entitled to First Amendment protection against governmental limitations on
political activity, on an equal basis with actual human persons, thereby
invalidating over a century of federal and state laws. 71 Obama, stunned,
immediately attacked the decision: "With its ruling today, the Supreme Court
has given a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our
politics."72 He then followed up with an unprecedented face-to-face
condemnation in his January 27, 2010, State of the Union address with three
signatories of the decision in the audience. 73 Three months later, when the
White House received Justice John Paul Stevens's notice that he would resign at
the end of the 2009-2010 Supreme Court Term on April 9, Obama was ready
with a pointedly worded recipe for plugging this gap. Obama would look for a
justice, he said, who combines "a fierce dedication to the rule of law" with "a
keen understanding of how the law affects the daily lives of the American
people." 74 He added, "It will also be someone who, like Justice Stevens, knows
that in a democracy, powerful interests must not be allowed to drown out the
voices of ordinary citizens."'75 Robert Barnes, the Washington Post's Supreme
Court correspondent, and Anne Kornblut translated this as reflecting a switch
on the part of progressives in and out of government, away from a focus on
"divisive social interests," to a new "major theme ... what Obama and
Democrats refer to as the pro-corporation leanings of the conservative members
71 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 949-54 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Press Release, Statement from the President on Today's Supreme Court Decision
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-
president-todays-supreme-court-decision-0,
73 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), in 156 CONG.
REC. H418 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2010) ("[T]he Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I
believe will open the floodgates for special interests-including foreign corporations-to
spend without limit in our elections. I don't think American elections should be bankrolled
by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities."); Adam Liptak, Six
Justices to Attend State of the Union, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/26/us/politics/26justices.html.
74 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Retirement of Justice
Stevens and on the West Virginia Mining Tragedy (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-retirement-justice-stevens-
and-west-virginia-mining-tragedy.
751d.
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of the Court."' 76 Barnes and Kornblut noted that court-focused progressive
advocacy groups, such as People for the American Way, Alliance for Justice,
Constitutional Accountability Center, and National Senior Citizens Law Center,
were stressing the same message, along with the Senate Judiciary Committee
members, who would examine Obama's selection to replace Stevens and make
a recommendation to the full Senate.77
4. Democrats Stay on Message for Justice Kagan's Confirmation
Obama's May 2010 message tracked the mantra developed in the Judiciary
Committee's oversight hearings. Specifically, the White House followed
Senator Leahy's lead in stressing fidelity to the "rule of law" as well as concern
for its impact on "ordinary citizens." During the 2008 campaign, Obama had
drawn Republican fire by stating that he was looking to name to the courts
judges who possessed "the empathy to understand what it's like" to be
vulnerable and disadvantaged.78 Conservatives seized on Obama's "empathy"
formulation as evidence that he wanted the courts to implement a
"redistributionist" agenda via "the appointment of judges committed in advance
to violating [their] oath," to "administer [equal] justice to the poor and to the
rich," and Republican senators presaged a similar line of attack as the struggle
over Stevens' replacement loomed.79 The Democrats countered aggressively, by
pointing to the Court's conservatives as the activists culpable for ignoring the
law to favor the powerful. On Meet the Press, Senator Leahy charged that the
Roberts Court is "the most activist court in my lifetime."'80 Specifically, he went
on, "They rewrote the law ... [so] that women could be paid less than men, 81
referring to the 2007 decision in Ledbetter,82  crippling workplace
discrimination guarantees (overturned with a February 2009 bill that was the
first that incoming President Obama signed into law83). "They rewrote the law,"
Leahy added, "to say that age discrimination laws won't apply if corporate
76 Robert Barnes & Anne E. Kornblut, Wanted on the Court: Sensitivity to Ordinary
Americans, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2010, at A3, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/25/
AR201004250291 8.html?sid=ST2010042502974.
7 7 Id.
78Adam Liptak et al., On the Issues: Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011),
http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/judges.html.
79 156 CONG. REC. S2219-20 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl);
Steven Calabresi, Op-Ed., Obama's 'Redistribution' Constitution, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28,
2008, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122515067227674187.html.
80 'Meet the Press' Transcriptfor April 11, 2011, MEET THE PRESS (Apr. 11, 2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36362669/ns/meet-the-press/t/meet-press-transcript-april.
811d.
82 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
83 Obama Touts Equal-Pay Bill at Signing Ceremony, supra note 66; see Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
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interests don't want them to," 84 referring to a 2009 5-4 decision that Justice
Stevens in dissent called "unabashed... judicial lawmaking." 85 Leahy
continued, "They rewrote the law to give ExxonMobil a $2 billion windfall," 86
attacking a 2008 decision that overturned a jury damages award to 40,000
families whose livelihoods were destroyed by the Exxon-Valdez oil spill.87
Throughout the process of securing confirmation of Justice Stevens'
successor, Elena Kagan, Democratic senators maintained unprecedented
discipline in turning the tables on Republicans, branding the Supreme Court's
conservative justices as "activists" of a conservative, pro-corporate genre.88 The
message caught the attention of media observers, who reported that "on 'activist
judges,' the parties have 'switched sides."' 89 The New York Times' Adam
Liptak observed that the Democrats' nominee, Elena Kagan, "repeatedly said
she would show 'great deference to Congress,"' but that, "[p]erhaps
surprisingly, that was not what many [Republican] senators seemed to want to
hear. They appeared to want the Supreme Court to save them from
themselves." 90
B. Progressive and Conservative Advocates Switch Sides on "Activism"
and "Originalism "
1. Conservatives Embrace Libertarian Activism
As Liptak's wise-crack reflected, it was not only progressives who had
"switched sides" on judicial activism. In 2010, conservative pundits, advocates,
and politicians executed a concerted about-face, unfurling a new approach,
Activist Judges, Please, as George Will titled a January 14 column. 91 Will
84 'Meet the Press' Transcript for April 11, 2011, supra note 80.
85 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86 'Meet the Press' Transcript for April 11, 2011, supra note 80.
87 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 481 (2008).
88 156 CONG. REC. S5220-23 (daily ed. June 22, 2010) (statements of Sens. Cardin,
Whitehouse & Franken).
89Simon Lazarus, Who's Ahead in the War over the Courts; After Kagan's Hearing
and the First Court Skirmish over Health Reform?, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-lazarus/whos-ahead-in-the-war-ove b_649379.html;
see also Stuart Taylor Jr., Double Standards on Display in Kagan Hearings, NEWSWEEK
(June 30, 2010), http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/30/double-standards-on-display-in-
kagan-hearings.html; Glenn Thrush, Dems Take Aim at Court Conservatives, POLITICO (Apr.
13, 2010, 4:45 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35709.html.
90 Adam Liptak, Kagan Reminds Senators: Legislation Is Your Job, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2010, at A 16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/us/politics/02assess.html.
91 George F. Will, Activist Judges, Please, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2010, at A19,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/13/AR201001
1303460.html (published online as "That Rock in the Health-care Road? It's Called the
Constitution.").
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acknowledged that most conservatives "deplore, often with more vigor than
precision, 'judicial activism."' 92 But mistakenly so: "More truly conservative
conservatives take their bearings from the proposition that government's
primary purpose is not to organize the fulfillment of majority preferences but to
protect preexisting [sic] rights of the individual-basically, liberty. These
conservatives favor judicial activism understood as unflinching performance of
the courts' role in that protection."93
As Will's reference to "more truly conservative conservatives" indicated,
there existed a conservative faction-libertarians-who for 25 years had
scorned mainstream conservatives' ritual encomiums for "judicial restraint" and
aversion to "judges who legislate from the bench." But this small cadre of
academics and advocates, who had continued to champion pre-New Deal
judicial constraints on federal economic regulatory authority, stood self-
consciously outside the mainstream of conservative constitutional
jurisprudence. 94 But at Elena Kagan's confirmation hearing, Republican
Judiciary Committee members, like their Democratic colleagues, read from a
new playbook, as previewed by Will and like-minded conservative pundits and
advocates. As framed by the opening statement of ranking Republican
Committee member Jeff Sessions of Alabama, "Americans want a judge who
will be a check on Government overreach, not a rubber-stamp." 95 Texas
Republican John Cornyn endorsed nothing less than replacing the Constitution
as it has been interpreted since the New Deal, and restoring a very different
"Framers' Constitution," in which "the Supreme Court has an important role in
limiting the reach of the Congress." 96 Oklahoma's Tom Coburn railed at "the
courts," for not doing "their job in limiting our ability to go outside of original
intent on what the Commerce Clause was supposed to be."'97 None too subtly,
the Republicans specifically targeted the health reform law and its allegedly
"unprecedented" requirement that most Americans carry health insurance or pay
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See, for example, MACEDO, supra note 6, which contains a laudatory foreword by
then-University of Chicago libertarian Richard Epstein and chapters titled, "The Framers of
the Constitution v. Judge Bork," "The Majoritarian Myth," and "Principled Judicial
Activism." The history of conflict between libertarian and mainstream conservative legal
thought-leaders is elaborated in Damon Root, Conservatives v. Libertarians: The Debate
over Judicial Activism Divides Former Allies, FREE REPUBLIC (June 8, 2010, 8:07 PM),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2530504/posts. See also Kendall & Sugameli,
supra note 6, at 2, 8.
95 The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l1th Cong. 7 (2010)
[hereinafter Nomination of Elena Kagan] (statement of Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, S.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
96 1d. at 160 (statement of John Comyn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
97 1d. at 182 (statement of Tom Coburn, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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a penalty-a prelude, Cobum warned, for mandates to "eat three vegetables and
three fruits every day."98
2. Progressives Discover and Apply Text, History, and Deference to
Congress
Senator Cornyn's yearning for a "Framers' Constitution" reflected a notion
repeated constantly by libertarian legal theorists and advocates, namely, that
only in 1937 did the Supreme Court invent the current constitutional regime of
expansive congressional authority and judicial deference to state as well as
federal economic regulatory legislation.99 Justice Clarence Thomas, the
Supreme Court's sole relatively consistent libertarian member, has called the
New Deal Court's 1937 shift a "wrong turn." 1
For over two decades, no serious attempt was made to critically evaluate
this libertarian shibboleth-that, measured against the Constitution, as
"originally" written and "intended"-"The post-New Deal administrative state
is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing
less than a bloodless constitutional revolution."10 1 However, as noted above, in
the last several years, Yale law professors Akhil Amar and Jack Balkin have
elaborately refuted this cramped version of the 1789 text and the intent of its
Framers (who were, after all, known as "federalists"), along with the Swedish
historian Max Edling. 10 2 To them, no objective was more critical than
981d. at 180
99 A series of decisions in 1937 definitively rejected the so-called Lochner Era doctrinal
apparatus that a conservative Supreme Court had deployed to abort numerous Progressive
and New Deal Era reforms. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), launched and has
come to symbolize this notoriously activist anti-regulatory regime of the first third of the
twentieth century. The case held that maximum hours regulation violated employers' and
employees' "freedom of contract," a "right" that the five-justice majority divined in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments' ban on deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Id. at
64.
100 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). D.C.
Circuit Judge Janice Rogers Brown used more florid language. See Janice Rogers Brown,
Assoc. Justice, Cal. Supreme Court, "A Whiter Shade of Pale": Sense and Nonsense-The
Pursuit of Perfection in Law and Politics, Speech to The Federalist Society at the University
of Chicago Law School 12 (April 20, 2000), available at http://www.communityrights.org/
PDFs/4-20-00FedSoc.pdf; see also, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTrrUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); RIcHARD EPSTEIN, How
PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION (2006).
101 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1231, 1231 (1994). To similar effect, Richard A. Epstein acknowledged that his
interpretation of the original understanding of the commerce power would entail the
"dismantling of large portions of the modem federal government." Richard Epstein, The
Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1455 (1987).
102 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Ron Chernow has brought the "original"
Federalists' priority imperative of building a strong and durable nation-state to a wide
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empowering the new central government to ensure a robust national economy
by countering balkanizing protectionist propensities on the part of the states and
mercantilist policies of foreign governments. Their work has been effectively
distilled by advocates for the constitutionality of the new health reform law. The
Department of Justice has cited Balkin's article, Commerce, arguing "All this
conduct by the uninsured-active and regular use of health care services,
economic decisions as to how to pay for those services, migration in and out of
insurance coverage, and shifting costs to other market participants-is, as
Congress found, economic activity.' 10 3 The Constitutional Accountability
Center has filed amicus curiae briefs in several of the ACA legal challenges as
well as written congressional testimony, noting that "[t]he Father of our Nation,
George Washington, and the other delegates to the Constitutional Convention
shared a conviction that the Constitution must establish a national government
of substantial power," and detailing the specific provisions they drafted and the
interpretations they contemplated to implement that "conviction."10 4
Summarizing the thrust of the powerful "originalist" case for current expansive
interpretations of congressional authority under the Commerce, Necessary and
Proper, and General Welfare ("tax-and-spend") Clauses, I wrote in a February
2011 Issue Brief for the American Constitution Society:
If anything, it would be more accurate to view what libertarian critics call the
New Deal Supreme Court's "revolution of 1937" as a restoration of the vision
of the original Framers, who sought to supplant the feckless Articles of
Confederation with a charter for effective and responsive national governance.
That vision was given doctrinal form by the Framers' contemporary Chief
Justice John Marshall and his fellow Supreme Court justices in the first third of
the nineteenth century. In the century between Marshall's iconic decisions and
the New Deal Court's reactivation of effective governance as a lodestar for
audience. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2005); RON CHERNOW,
WASHINGTON: A LIFE (2010).
103Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 7, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 4949245 (citing
Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 46-47 (2010)), available at
http://www.justice.govlhealthcare/docs/florida-mccollum-v-hhs-summary-judgment-
opposition.pdf; see also Brief of Amici Curiae State Legislators in Support of Defendants-
Appellants, supra note 14, at 16-17; Simon Lazarus, The Health Care Lawsuits: Unraveling
a Century of Constitutional Law and the Fabric of Modern American Government, AM.
CONST. SOC'Y, 11-14 (Feb. 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/lazarus_-
-healthreformlawsuits 0.pdf; Ian Millhiser, Rally 'Round the "True Constitution," AM.
PROSPECT (Aug. 25, 2009), http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=rally round the true
_constitution; Ian Millhiser, Why George Washington Would Disagree with the Right Wing
About Health Care's Constitutionality, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 23, 2010, 8:00 PM),
http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/03/23/88253/cuccinelli-washington/.
104 Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional Accountability Center in Support of Appellant
and Reversal at 2-3, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058), 2011 WL 792217, at *2-3.
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constitutional interpretation, the textual basis for robust federal authority was
materially enhanced by the Reconstruction and Progressive Era
Amendments. 1 05
3. Warm-up for the Main Event: Conservatives' 1990s "Federalism"
Boomlet and Progressives' Originalist Response
By thus refuting libertarians' claim that the ACA (and the entire edifice of
twentieth-century progressive government) is inconsistent with the text and
original meaning of the Constitution, current progressives echo arguments made
a decade ago, the last time conservatives threatened a major judicial rollback of
Congress' post-1937 authority. This was the so-called "federalism revolution,"
in which the five-justice conservative bloc began in 1995 to discover heretofore
unknown states' rights-oriented limitations on congressional power to
implement the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. A series of
5-4 decisions contracting federal power in the name of "federalism" provoked
vigorous dissents from the progressive justices, as well as strong protest from
progressive and even some conservative opinion shapers and politicians. The
progressive justices' case emphasized that the doctrinal initiatives the
conservative justices had devised to shrink federal legislative authority flouted
the text, original meaning, and, indeed, the intent of the Framers of the
constitutional provisions which they purported to interpret. 10 6
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the conservative bloc held that an
expansive concept of state "sovereign immunity" barred Congress from
authorizing Indian tribes to sue states to enforce federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the so-called "Indian Commerce Clause"-its specification that
Congress may "regulate commerce ... with the Indian tribes."'1 7 The majority
105Lazarus, supra note 103, at 4 (footnote omitted). Conservative and libertarian
observers have taken note of claims by progressive scholars and advocates that the text and
original meaning of the Constitution support the post-1937 vision of federal authority
granted by the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and General Welfare Clauses. See
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 25; Damon W. Root, Are We All Originalists Now?,
REASON.COM (Feb. 11, 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/02/1 1/are-we-all-originalists-
now.
106See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 770-72 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how the late eighteenth century legislative history
surrounding the passage of the Eleventh Amendment contradicted the holding of the justices
writing for the conservative majority); id. at 772 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
eighteenth century history and the Framers' intent would permit the federal government to
sue a State without consent); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 646 n.14 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (referencing the 1787 Constitution to argue that judges who claim to
be able to identify specific areas of state regulation immune from plenary congressional
commerce power are denying constitutional history); id. at 647-48 (arguing that the
majority's opinion in favor of the Court drawing the line between national and state interests
contradicts the constitutional approach and philosophy of the Framers).
107517 U.S. 44, 93 (1996).
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acknowledged that the text of the Eleventh Amendment, on which the new
doctrine was based, bars federal courts from entertaining only diversity of
citizenship-based suits against state governments by "Citizens of another
State," or foreigners. 108 But, the opinion contended, the Amendment should
properly be read to mandate a far broader implicit "presupposition," namely,
that a state government cannot be amenable to suit by an individual without its
consent, because such immunity is "inherent in the nature of sovereignty" and
each state is a "sovereign entity in our federal system." 10 9
In dissent, Justice Stevens contended that, far from being a "postulate"
embedded by the Framers in the original design of the Constitution, sovereign
immunity in eighteenth-century jurisprudence was "entirely the product of
[English] judge-made [common] law" derived from royalist and established
religion precepts, which were anathema to the revolutionary generation, and
that Chief Justice Marshall had expressly confirmed that the Amendment should
not be read broadly to enact an amorphous concept of protecting states'
sovereign "dignity."' ' 0 Justice Souter elaborated on Justice Stevens' originalist
case. He exhaustively reviewed the debates in the 1787 Philadelphia
Convention, the post-Convention ratification debates, Chief Justice Marshall's
key decisions, and other contemporaneous sources. 111 He also noted that "plain
text" should necessarily trump the allegedly implicit "background principle[s]"
and "postulates" on which the conservative majority purported to the new
doctrinal weapon it had handed to them in Congress's legislative authority. 112
Justice Souter's eighty-five-page analysis relied heavily on scholarship by Akhil
Amar and historian Gordon Wood. 11 3
To underscore what they perceived as a historic threat posed by the
conservative bloc's drive to retrench congressional authority, the four
progressive justices, through their leader Justice Stevens, took the extraordinary
step of refusing "to accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent."" t 4 Justice
Stevens explained that the open-ended doctrinal barrier to ensuring state
compliance with federal law is "so fundamentally inconsistent with the
Framers' conception of the constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to
the usual deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court.' 1 5 fn the same
vein, he elaborated:
108Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
109 Id. (citations omitted).
1 10 Id. at 95-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I I I See id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., dissenting).
12Id. at 116 n.13.
113 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 137, 152 n.47, 155, 160, 164 nn.57-58.
114 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 97 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
115 Id. at 97-98.
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There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court's
conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits
Congress' power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to
enforce federal law against the States. The importance of respecting the
Framers' decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the Congress dictates
firm resistance to the present majority's repeated substitution of its own views
of federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by ,the Congress and
signed by the President. 116
Finally, Justice Stevens linked his text-and-original-meaning and Framers'
intent arguments to judicial restraint, and sealed them together as a package
spotlighting the conservative justices' "radical judicial activism":
The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v.
Maine, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd v. College Savings
Bank, and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.
Expense Bd., represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this
Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises. 
117
During the decade since he completed his originalist critique of the
conservative justices' "federalism" offensive, Justice Stevens in particular has
deployed similar themes attacking conservative efforts to cripple environmental
regulation by expanding the doctrine of "regulatory takings,""l 8 to apply the
Second Amendment to restrictions on individual gun ownership and use,1 19 and
in particular, the conservative majority's 2009 expansion of the First
Amendment to bar regulation of corporate political activity. 120 In the latter case,
Stevens showcased his highly nuanced appreciation of the academic and
1161d. at 96.
117 1d. at 98-99 (citations omitted) (disagreeing with the majority's opinion that
Congress lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity against suits to enforce the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). Seminole Tribe launched a conservative trend of
weakening federal powers by holding that Congress lacks the power to abrogate immunity
against suits to enforce statutes implementing its Commerce Clause authority. 517 U.S. at
47. These other cases Justice Stevens listed extended the principle: Alden held that Congress
lacked the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity from suits brought in state courts,
and the Florida Prepaid cases found that federal patent and trademark statutes improperly
abrogated states' sovereign immunity by applying the strict congruent and proportional test
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment's Section Five enforcement power. Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 707 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
118 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321 (2002).
1l9 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-81 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
12 0See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929-80 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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judicial originalism debate (and implicitly disavowed embracing originalism of
whatever stripe as an exclusively legitimate mode of interpretation). "As a
matter of original expectations," he wrote:
[I]t seems absurd to think that the First Amendment prohibits legislatures from
taking into account the corporate identity of a sponsor of electoral advocacy.
As a matter of original meaning, it likewise seems baseless-unless one
evaluates the First Amendment's "principles," or its "purpose," at such a high
level of generality that the historical understandings of the Amendment cease
to be a meaningful constraint on the judicial task. This case sheds a revelatory
light on the assumption of some that an impartial judge's application of an
originalist methodology is likely to yield more determinate answers, or to play
a more decisive role in the decisional process, than his or her views about
sound policy. 121
Stevens also packaged textual, original intent and meaning, and anti-activist
arguments in attacking the conservative majority's business-friendly
jurisprudence narrowing the scope of federal and state statutes protecting
consumers, employees, and others. In the summer of 2009, the conservative
majority reached out to decide, as it had the previous January in Citizens
United, a question not presented by a narrow petition for review. Their decision,
in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, drastically tightened standards for proving
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Justice Stevens'
dissent alerted advocates for aging, employee, and civil rights communities,
their Capitol Hill allies, and court-focused media to the majority's contraction
of age discrimination protections. Stevens called out the conservative bloc for
its procedural and substantive activism: "unabashed judicial lawmaking,"
"especially irresponsible" for "choos[ing]" to answer a question that had "not
been briefed" by the parties or the Justice Department, and adding that "the
majority's inattention to prudential Court practices is matched by its utter
disregard of our precedent and Congress' intent." 122
In the same vein, in 2001, Stevens also replied sharply when the
conservative bloc turned the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act into a platform for
empowering all employers nationwide to require employees to challenge
employer violations of all state and federal laws in binding, mandatory
121 Id. at 951 (citations omitted). Elsewhere Justice Stevens observed of the conservative
majority's originalist arguments:
The truth is we cannot be certain how a law such as BCRA § 203 meshes with the
original meaning of the First Amendment. I have given several reasons why I believe
the Constitution would have been understood then, and ought to be understood now, to
permit reasonable restrictions on corporate electioneering .... The Court enlists the
Framers in its defense without seriously grappling with their understandings of
corporations or the free speech right, or with the republican principles that underlay
those understandings.
Id. at 952 (footnote omitted).
122Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2353, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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arbitration proceedings that are both employer-structured and employer-
friendly. Dissenting in this case, Circuit City Stores v. Adams, Stevens wrote
that "Today... the Court fulfills the original-and originally unfounded-fears
of organized labor by essentially rewriting the text of [the Federal Arbitration
Act] .... [An exhaustive review of its legislative history makes] clear that it
was not intended to apply to employment contracts at all."'123
4. Senator Whitehouse Tries Out Progressive Originalism
So far, in real-world constitutional debates, originalist types of arguments
have been deployed almost exclusively by Supreme Court justices-in
particular former Justice Souter and, especially, former Justice Stevens-as well
as a still-small cadre of court-focused advocates. Progressive politicians, for the
most part, have continued to shun engaging in constitutional argumentation of
any stripe, preferring instead to rely on the don't-twist-the-law-to-favor-the-big-
guy theme in battles about the courts. However, one particularly thoughtful
Judiciary Committee Democrat, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island,
has imaginatively fused the two approaches. Speaking on March 11, 2011, prior
to an Alliance for Justice Panel, "Are Pro-Corporate Decisions Hurting
Everyday Americans?", Senator Whitehouse gave a constitutional, originalist,
frame to his critique of pro-business Roberts Court decisions by branding them
antithetical to the constitutionally prescribed role of the jury. 124 Within the
"beautifully designed mechanism" of constitutional checks and balances, he
said, "our nation's Founders created... the jury ... to ensure that everyday
Americans retain a forum where they can get a fair shake against powerful
interests." 125 The Framers, he noted, "put the jury in three separate provisions
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights." 126 He cited Blackstone and De
123Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 129 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
124 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Keynote Address at Equal Justice for All (Mar. 11,
2009), available at http://afjjusticewatch.blogspot.com/2011/03/equal-justice-for-all-
senator.html, at 11:00-16:00. His list substantially matched the cases highlighted by
Judiciary Committee hearings summarized above. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2347; Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007); Short-Change, supra note 13; see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc.
v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (barring individuals subject to binding mandatory
arbitration agreements from challenging such agreements in court as unconscionable under
pertinent state law); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (strengthening the application
of Twombly to heighten pleading standards more broadly in federal civil courts); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling a 96-year-old
antitrust precedent to hold that vertical price restraints were not illegal per se under section 1
of the Sherman Act); Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (increasing the
pleading requirements to survive a motion to dismiss for potential violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act).
125 Whitehouse, supra note 124, at 5:35.
1261d. at 6:25-7:15.
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Tocqueville for the crucial political role of the jury as understood in the early
days of the republic, as "a mode of the sovereignty of the people."'127 Senator
Whitehouse's argument was not inadvertent nor intended to be an isolated
phenomenon. During the question-and-answer session following his remarks, he
differentiated his approach from approaches traditionally favored by many of
the court-focused progressive advocates in the audience. He advised them to
"ground our arguments in really basic constitutional principles," as he did, and
stress the "impressive pedigree" of iconic figures from the founding period
"behind progressive positions. 1 2 He concluded, "the more we ground our
arguments in those areas, the stronger we will be [but] if we are just talking
about 'rights,' [it will be a harder sell]."'1 29
C. Why Does It Matter? Progressives Stress "Real- World
Consequences "
Of course, even the most compelling demonstration that text and original
meaning point to a progressive outcome-or, for that matter, a conservative
outcome-is unlikely, standing alone, to carry the day with ordinary citizens,
media representatives, politicians, or even judges. Before just about anyone,
certainly anyone who is not a lawyer, decides which side to go with in an
esoteric legal argument, they want to know what is at stake-why, to whom,
and how much it matters. They want both the reassurance that a legal advocate
or decision maker conscientiously follows pertinent legal provisions and rules
and an understanding of the real-world consequences of alternative
interpretations or doctrinal approaches. Too often, progressives have lost sight
of the need to push both the legal theory and the practical consequences buttons,
simultaneously. For example, during his September 2005 hearing, Chief Justice
Roberts was challenged for systematically favoring the "big guy." He shot back,
"[I]f the Constitution says that the little guy should win, the little guy is going to
win in court before me. But if the Constitution says that the big guy should win,
well, then the big guy's going to win, because my obligation is to the
Constitution." 130
Roberts' retort silenced his interrogator, Senator Dick Durbin. To preempt
such counter-attacks, Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats, the White House,
and advocacy groups have learned to conspicuously link their populism with
fidelity to the rule of law. They emphasize, as noted above, both that the
Roberts Court threatened "everyday Americans... economic security, and that
the conservative Justices were "activists" who "rewrote the law" to reach pro-
127Id. at 7:26.
12 8 1d. at 39:13.
129Id. at 39:47.
130 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 448 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Supreme Court Chief Justice nominee).
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corporate results. 131 Thus, progressive advocates sow skepticism about
conservatives' legal argumentation by spotlighting its adverse practical
consequences for constituencies traditionally uninterested in the culture war
controversies that have dominated media and public perceptions of the wars
over the courts and the Constitution.
While Senate Democrats and the Obama Administration have focused on
their don't-twist-the-law-to-favor-the-big-guy theme, on the Supreme Court,
Justice Stephen Breyer has sought to expound a broader response to
conservative originalism that similarly emphasizes "look[ing] to consequences,
including 'contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the
community to be affected.""' 132 Justice Breyer has put his theory into practice,
for example, in his widely admired dissent from the Court's 5-4 2007 decision
to strike down Louisville, Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington public school
integration plans that included students' race among criteria for assigning them
to schools. Justice Breyer detailed the long history of segregation and
resegregation that the Seattle and Louisville school districts had sought to
remediate, elaborating the options that had been tried, abandoned, allowed,
disallowed, failed, and succeeded, however temporarily or partially. His
seventy-two-page opinion started by emphasizing that "[t]he historical and
factual context in which these cases arise is critical. ' 133 In addition to chiding
the five-Justice majority for "distort[ing] precedent" and "misapply[ing] the
relevant constitutional principles," Justice Breyer's principal line of attack on
the majority's new "legal rules" is "that [they] will obstruct efforts by state and
local governments to deal effectively with the growing resegregation of public
schools, [they] threaten[] to substitute for present calm a disruptive round of
race-related litigation, and [they] undermine[] Brown's promise of integrated
primary and secondary education that local communities have sought to make a
reality."134
Another recent example of consequences-oriented advocacy, on an issue
kindred to that at stake in the Louisville-Seattle integration cases, was the
contentions made in amici curiae briefs filed by national business leaders and
retired military officers in the 2003 higher education affirmative action case,
Grutter v. Bollinger.'35 Although not themselves ordinarily considered
progressive in their own outlook, these two groups made arguments about the
131 See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
132 STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIvE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONsTITUTION 18 (2005) (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109 (Irving
Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)).
133 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 804 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
134 1d. at 803-04.
13 5 See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399056;
Consolidated Brief for Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 1787554.
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real-world issues at stake that proved compelling to swing-Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. In her words, writing for the five-Justice majority that voted to
uphold the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action student
selection criteria, Justice O'Connor noted that the business leaders' brief "made
clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only
be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints"; similarly, she quoted the military leaders' briefs contention that a
"highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle [sic] mission to provide national security. ' 136 The
military officers' brief was expressly referenced during the oral argument by
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kennedy. 137
Such approaches to constitutional argumentation were famously pioneered
by Louis Brandeis as an advocate a century ago, before his nomination to the
Supreme Court. Like his "Brandeis briefs," these contemporary efforts
undermine the credibility of abstract doctrines invented by conservative legal
advocates and judges by underscoring their destructive impact on efforts by
democratically elected institutions to address grave and difficult societal
problems. For example, contemporary conservatives insist, contrary to the text
and, especially, the history, of the Fourteenth Amendment, that its Equal
Protection Clause mandates rigid "color-blind" rules that cripple efforts to
encourage racial diversity. 138 This substitution of ideological abstraction for
text-and-history-grounded interpretation is on par with the Lochner Court's
invocation of the "freedom of contract" shibboleth to invalidate legislation
addressed to wages, hours, and other working conditions important to the
welfare of industrial workers. 139
As illustrated by these examples, effective consequence-oriented advocacy
includes three important components. First, arguments about adverse real-world
effects are complemented by arguments attacking the opponents' technical legal
case. Second, ideally, the particular adverse consequences spotlighted target
issues and constituencies calculated to expand the base of support for
progressive goals at stake. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's
hearings are aimed at raising the consciousness of "everyday Americans" about
the impact of the Supreme Court on pocketbook issues important to them. The
Grutter briefs' spotlighting of national business and military needs appeal to
concerns, constituencies, and judges-such as Justice O'Connor-likely to be
indifferent or even presumptively hostile to the idea of racial preferences.
136 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
137 0ral Argument at 5:24, 10:10, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_241/argument. The military brief was
principally written by Virginia Seitz, then a partner in Sidley Austin LLP, recently
confirmed as President Obama's Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.
13 8 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 804.
139 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); see also Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923); Hammer v. Daggenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269 (1918).
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Justice Breyer's focus on the conservative majority's indifference to local
elected school boards appeals likewise to moderates' and traditional
conservatives' commitment to judicial restraint and deference to democratic
decision making. 140
The third element typically associated with progressive advocacy
emphasizing the adverse practical consequences of conservative positions is a
link to the purpose of the provisions of the Constitution or statute at issue, and
the glaring anomalousness of those consequences in light of that purpose.
Justice Breyer counsels judges, when faced with "ambiguous text," to "rely
heavily on purposes and related consequences."'' a l Following his own advice,
after detailing the adverse consequences for local racial diversity efforts of the
Louisville-Seattle schools decision, his punch-line invoked the fundamental
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment on which the majority purported to rely;
consequences so grave and detrimental to racial equality, he concluded, "cannot
be justified in the name of the Equal Protection Clause."'142
Contrasting regressive consequences with progressive purposes is
especially common, and can be especially effective, as a means of undermining
the credibility of statutory interpretations that narrow or nullify the protections
or benefits the statutes were enacted to provide. A good example is Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in the Ledbetter case. As noted above, she showed that the
majority's interpretation of the statute of limitations provision of Title VII
rendered useless its core guarantee of equal pay opportunity. 143 Her compelling
description resonated broadly, gaining sympathetic attention from people who
ordinarily take no notice of Supreme Court decisions, but who know well
employers' secretiveness about what they pay individual employees. In similar
terms, also noted above, Senator Leahy upbraided the Court's conservative bloc
for decisions that, like Ledbetter, turned consumer and employee protection
laws "on their heads,. . . making them protections for big business rather than
for ordinary citizens." 144 Likewise, Justice Stevens repeatedly detailed how
14 0 Distinguished Republican appellate appointees rejected the Parents Involved
majority's result and reasoning on pragmatic deference grounds parallel to Justice Breyer's
reasoning in his dissent. See Parents Involved in Cmty Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426
F.3d 1162, 1194 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm.,
418 F.3d 1, 27-29 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring). Brandeis' focus on the horrific
working conditions that Progressive Era workplace regulatory legislation was intended to
rectify similarly complemented arguments anchored in judicial restraint, at least as
reinforced by points such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' iconic statement in his Lochner
dissent that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
141 STEVEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEw 81 (2010).
142 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 660 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
144 Short-Change, supra note 13, at 1; see also Courting Big Business, supra note 53.
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improbable or cramped interpretations produced consequences at odds with the
major, generally progressive, purposes behind statutes.1 45
V. WHERE To Go FROM HERE: SOME SUGGESTIONS
In the race to dominate the politics of the Constitution and the courts,
conservatives and progressives have traded places. Compared to their respective
positions through the last third of the twentieth century, conservatives are now
Hertz, progressives are Avis. Progressives are behind. To catch up, they need to
try harder. Above all, they need to try smarter, to recapture command of
Americans'-and, indeed, major progressive constituencies'-vision of what
the Constitution means, why it matters, and what judges (as distinguished from
legislators, presidents, and voters) should-and should not do-to realize that
vision.
A. Update the Threat Assessment and Upgrade the Strategy
The first challenge for progressives is to update their assessment of the
threat from the right's agenda for the Constitution and the courts, and upgrade
the priority assigned to countering that threat. As is increasingly recognized, the
problem is no longer simply that personal and civil liberties created by the
Warren and Burger Courts could be (and are being) stripped away. For sure,
that prospect is real. But it is now subsumed by two new levels of threat that are
potentially existential for progressive governance. First, as embodied most
visibly by the ACA legal challenges, the libertarian rise within conservative
legal circles, paralleling the Tea Party's political surge, targets the constitutional
regime prioritizing effective and responsive national governance first
recognized by Chief Justice Marshall and reaffirmed by the New Deal Court
after 1937.146 In principle, this agenda puts at risk the entire edifice of
progressive laws and programs built during the twentieth century, as well as the
major enhancements added by President Barack Obama and the 1 l1th
Congress. As noted above, Republican politicians are in no way shy about
touting this activist agenda, evidently banking on net political gains from
145 Harvard law professor John F. Manning (among others) has written that Justice
Stevens was:
[Tihe Court's most vocal and, I believe, the ablest defender of... the post-New Deal
consensus on statutory interpretation: the idea that legislation is a purposive act, and
that judges should interpret acts of Congress to implement the legislative purpose, even
if it requires some deviation from the semantic detail of the enacted text [to avoid
consequences at odds with the legislative purpose].
John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2009, 2009 (2006).
146See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 14, at 5-9 (attempting to detail the doctrinal
components of the Marshall-post-New Deal-regime and the radically different
components of the libertarian regime advanced by the ACA legal challenges).
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espousing a judiciary bent on "check[ing] ... government overreach."' 147 As
observed by Jeffrey Toobin in September 2010:
For the first time since Franklin D. Roosevelt battled the Supreme Court
over the New Deal, a Democratic President is seeking to strengthen and
expand the regulatory power of the federal government, and his opponents, as
in the nineteen-thirties, are fighting back in the courts. A legal assault on
President Obama's agenda has begun, and his adversaries have already won
several important [if inconclusive] victories. 148
Less widely noted, but no less menacing to progressive political and
statutory accomplishments, the Roberts Court has intensified the multi-front
campaign carried on for two decades under Chief Justice Rehnquist, to nullify
progressive laws through a myriad of non-constitutional techniques. 149
The second new existential threat from the Right is the blatant drive to turn
constitutional text, history, and precedent upside-down in order to stack the
political deck against Democrats and progressive constituencies, and decisively
advantage Republicans and conservative constituencies. With only a one vote
majority, and in the face of scathing dissents and criticism, the Rehnquist and
Roberts Courts have: reversed a state supreme court's reasonable interpretation
of its own election law to ensure the election of a Republican president; 50
turned a resolutely blind eye to sanction Republican legislatures' machinations
to disenfranchise elderly, minority, student, and other progressive constituencies
no less overt than the poll tax in the pre-1965 deep South; 151 overturned a
147 Nomination ofElena Kagan, supra note 95, at 7 (statement of Jeff Sessions, Ranking
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
14 8 Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle: Can Stephen Breyer Save the Obama Agenda in
the Supreme Court?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 27, 2010, at 34.
149 See Courting Big Business, supra note 53; Short-Change, supra note 13; Simon
Lazarus, Repealing the 20th Century, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=repealingthe_20th-century; Simon Lazarus & Harper
Jean Tobin, The Supreme Court's Two-Front War on the Safety Net: A Cautionary Tale for
Health Reformers, AM. CONST. Soc'Y (Jan. 30, 2009),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Lazarus%20Tobin%201ssue%2OBrief_0.pdf. The
extensive academic and judicial literature is treated by William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P.
Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 2006). These experts observe that "skewering the
interpretation of a statute may involve as much judicial activism as declaring it
unconstitutional," that canons of interpretation that the Rehnquist and Roberts conservative
blocs have made a principal tool are "notoriously manipulable and dynamic," and that the
conservative justices' "federalism canons" in particular are "part of an overall judicial plan
to limit federal power in modem America." Id. at 359, 374, 385.
150 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
151 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). In a July 6, 2011
speech, former President Bill Clinton observed, "There has never been in my lifetime, since
we got rid of the poll tax and all the Jim Crow burdens on voting, the determined effort to
limit the franchise that we see today," citing measures pending or enacted by Republican
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century of constitutional precedent and pervasive legislative practice to green-
light unprecedented billions of dollars in anonymous corporate political
investment; 152 and crippled public funding strategies to reduce the dominance
of financial power in politics.153
B. Make Messaging Work Beyond Progressive Echo-Chambers
As noted above, the reasons why progressives have fallen behind in shaping
the constitutional agenda include socio-political "structural" circumstances that
cannot be willed away merely by tweaking messaging strategies. Nevertheless,
getting the message or messages right, and communicating them effectively, is
an essential prerequisite to turning this tide. That means finding the discipline
to:
* Discard approaches that resonate within coastal and campus progressive
echo-chambers but fall flat or backfire with broader sectors of the
public, opinion-shapers, and the political class.
• Develop strategies that persuade non-court-focused progressive
constituencies-and moderate constituencies-that they have a
significant stake in the war over the courts and the Constitution.
The three emergent new progressive messaging strategies identified in the
previous section of this article have potential for satisfying the above criteria-
if they are rigorously and consistently deployed.
1. Clone the Ledbetter Template
"Don't-twist-the-law-to-favor-the-big-guy" has demonstrated its potential
for engaging constituencies heretofore indifferent to court-related issues. The
primary piece of evidence is the reaction of the public, and of politicians, to the
Ledbetter case, discussed above. 154 That history seems to indicate that, while
media representatives and politicians tend at first blush to turn up their noses at
disputes over legal minutiae between businesses or other large organizations
and workers, consumers, retirees, depositors, or the like, the very "ordinariness"
of the individual protagonists and their stories of mistreatment have great
potential to resonate, if brought to the attention of equally ordinary voters. The
challenge for progressives is to find the will, the skill, and the resources to get
those stories down to the grass roots, and keep them coming.
legislatures in Florida, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Ohio. Darren Samuelsohn, Clinton
Likens GOP Effort to Jim Crow, POLITICO (July 6, 2011, 1:08 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/58419.html.
152 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
153 See Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011).
15 4 See supra Part III.A.2.
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In the Ledbetter situation, Justice Ginsburg first sparked media attention by
reading her passionate dissent from the bench. Following up, leading women's
rights organizations skillfully executed a sustained campaign to disseminate the
story of how Lilly Ledbetter's employer systematically short-changed her, and
the absurd injustice of the Supreme Court's rationale for reversing the jury
verdict in her favor. The campaign also benefitted greatly, initially in 2007 and
2008, from committed and skillful leadership from House leaders Rosa
DeLauro and George Miller and Senator Ted Kennedy, then from presidential
candidate Barack Obama's decision to make Ledbetter a visible accessory to his
2008 campaign.
Even before Obama adopted the cause during the summer of 2008, the
impact on the electorate of the Ledbetter messaging campaign registered, when
in April of that year, six Republicans broke ranks to support a nearly successful
motion to end the filibuster against the Democrats' "fix" legislation. Moreover,
a credible argument can be made that the sharp public reaction and Congress'
swift reversal of the Supreme Court's decision prompted the Court's
conservatives to trim their sails and confound veteran court observers by ruling
for plaintiffs in five of the six employment discrimination cases heard during
the subsequent 2007-2008 Term. 155 At the beginning of the Term, four months
after the Ledbetter decision, observers read the Court's grants of review in at
least three of these cases as portending its extending the pro-employer thrust of
Ledbetter and further overruling or hollowing out governing precedent. 156 That
conservative justices joined the four progressive justices to do just the opposite
may have been a reaction to the public and legislative backlash to their original
2007 decision. 157
In addition to the Ledbetter case and subsequent legislative campaign, at
least one other business-friendly Supreme Court decision, the Citizens United
ruling barring restrictions on corporate political activity, struck a public nerve.
President Obama's 2010 State of the Union criticism of the decision, plus
Justice Alito's spontaneous display of anger in the audience, no doubt helped to
catch public attention. Citizens United is an especially compelling exhibit for
155 See Charles A. Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007-2008 Supreme Court
Term, A.B.A., 4 (Sept. 2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/labor/
lel-pdf/scu_2008.authcheckdam.pdf.
1 56 See, e.g., The Roberts Court Round Three: What to Look For, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/10/robertscourt_
tp.html.
157 The New York Times' Linda Greenhouse observed:
Perhaps the conservative justices were taken aback by the public response to the
Lilly Ledbetter case... [which] led to Congressional hearings during which the court
was denounced as out of touch with the reality of women's working lives. A bill to
overturn the decision failed in the Senate, but came close.
Linda Greenhouse, In Latest Term, Majority Grows to More than 5 of the Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2008, at Al.
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the case progressives need to be making, as it shows the conservative bloc so
eager to change the law to favor business interests that it was willing to reach
out to decide issues not originally argued by any party to the case, willing to
overturn a century of precedent and practice, and willing to rely on a legal
theory--equating corporations with living persons for First Amendment
purposes-that strikes ordinary people as perverse. Justice Stevens' messaging
in his ninety-page dissenting opinion included these thrusts:
[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no
desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human
beings,... [blut they are not themselves members of "We The People" by
whom and for whom our Constitution was established.
... Congress has placed special limitations on campaign spending by
corporations ever since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907 .... The Court
today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between
corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce [a recent precedent overturned by
Citizens United].
... Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the case
before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an opportunity to
change the law.
... The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and McConnell is the
composition of this Court.
In addition, Citizens United validates the claim that the conservative
Justices are not above rigging political competition to favor their patrons and
allies. As Justice Stevens observed, "The Court's ruling threatens to undermine
the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation." 158
Conservative court-watchers have taken note, as National Review's Ramesh
Ponnuru recently wrote, "The idea that the Supreme Court is too pro-business is
rapidly becoming the central liberal critique of the institution," and, during
Justice Kagan's confirmation hearings, "Democrats made their theme the need
to counter pro-business activism by the conservatives on the court." Ponnuru
also noted that the Democrats' messaging strategy was catching on, that
"[p]ress coverage has mostly echoed" their line-for example, summing up the
158 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930, 932, 942, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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2010-2011 term, Reuters "ran the headline, 'Big business scores key Supreme
Court wins."' 159
But, while progressive forces have demonstrated the effectiveness of their
"don't-twist-the-law-to-favor-the-big-guy" message, they have deployed the
strategy only spottily. For its part, as soon as Justice Kagan was confirmed, the
Obama Administration lost visible interest in the message and, for that matter,
in the battle for the courts in general. The White House has fought Republicans'
stonewalling of its lower court nominees exclusively as an inside game, and
somewhat fitfully at that. There has been little, if any, public spotlighting of
Republican obstructionism on this front. More importantly, no attempt has been
made to keep before the press the rationale honed during Justice Kagan's
confirmation as to why this partisan judicial nominations struggle matters-the
need for judges who uphold laws that protect ordinary Americans' interests.
The Administration has not availed itself of the multiple opportunities presented
by Supreme Court cases about Ledbetter-like issues to underscore the
Judiciary's threat to unravel pocketbook legal protections (simultaneously
showcasing the President's attentiveness to ordinary people's basic needs). The
Administration could, for example: send high-level witnesses to testify in
hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee and other committees;
intervene aggressively in cases before the Supreme Court and lower courts;
promote enactment of corrective legislation like that which Obama signed into
law to overturn the Ledbetter decision; and generally highlight its initiatives,
actions, and battles on pocketbook issues (such as Elizabeth Warren's struggle
to launch and head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau created by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act).
For their part, progressive groups and leaders have themselves not always
grasped the potential illuminated by the Ledbetter example. As one apparent
example, senior advocacy groups failed to match the women's groups'
Ledbetter success and respond forcefully to the Court's similar 2009 Gross
decision that weakened age discrimination protections. Like Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Stevens sought to spark such a campaign with a fiery dissent denouncing
the conservative majority's irresponsible "judicial lawmaking."'160 House and
Senate leaders who managed the Ledbetter-fix legislation saw the case as low-
hanging fruit, an opportunity to show their solicitude for older workers, as well
as a likely legislative victory. They immediately sought to organize a repeat
effort to overturn Gross, introduced legislation within weeks of the decision,
159 Ramesh Ponnuru, Supreme Court Isn't Pro-Business, but Should Be, BLOOMBERG
(July 5, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-05/supreme-court-isn-
t-pro-business-but-should-be-ramesh-ponnuru.html; James Vicini, Analysis: Big Business
Scores Key Supreme Court Term Wins, REUTERS (June 28, 2011, 3:29 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/us-usa-court-business-idUSTRE75R68X
20110628.
160 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 72:61240
PROGRESSIVES' QUEST
and quickly held hearings. 161 It seemed to observers that Jack Gross, the
discrimination victim and 54-year-old mid-level executive whose jury award the
Supreme Court nullified, had no less potential than Lilly Ledbetter to provoke
widespread sympathetic concern as an "everyday American." The Chamber of
Commerce was open to negotiating a consensus bill, and, indeed, discussions
between the Chamber and a coalition led by the Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights appeared, for a time, to be heading toward a bipartisan bill
that would pass without opposition. But senior advocates, focused on enacting
the ACA and defending the major senior benefit programs, launched no
campaign to turn Jack Gross into the sort of national symbol of age
discrimination that Lilly Ledbetter became for gender discrimination. The
impetus necessary to maintain the issue as an action item on the crowded
legislative agenda faded, and the bill died. An opportunity to alert a major
constituency to the threat to its interests posed by a conservative judiciary was
squandered.
In sum, progressives, in and out of government, have the "don't-twist-the-
law-to-favor-the-big-guy" message down, but they have not uniformly seen the
need, nor grasped available means, to get it out.
2. Embrace the Civics Class Canon
As noted above, some progressives, principally academics, persist in
making an issue of "originalism." They deride emphasis on constitutional text
and history, as lacking intellectual integrity or even as capitulation to the
enemy, while inaccurately crediting conservatives' gains in the political wars
over the courts to their originalist credo. 162 To be sure, as an academic exercise,
debating originalism, or other interpretive methodological "-isms," is entirely
appropriate. But, from the standpoint of successful legal and political advocacy,
this preoccupation with originalism is misplaced and a highly counterproductive
distraction. To begin with, it conflates originalism as a legal philosophical
concept (or concepts) with originalism as a political slogan. In the latter
capacity, its value to conservatives has nothing to do with the components of
originalist jurisprudence or the issues debated by academics. Originalism works,
politically, because it is, as many have observed, a handy "dog-whistle. 1 63 To
161 See, e.g., Workplace Fairness: Has the Supreme Court Been Misinterpreting Laws
Designed to Protect American Workers from Discrimination: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. 111-396 (2009).
162See Siegel & Post, supra note 27; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Demise of "Originalism,"
HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2011, 12:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-
stone/the-demise-of-originalism b 871502.html.
163 See, for example, Ed Kilgore in The New Republic on October 14, 2010: "When
Sharron Angle wasn't saying something outrageous, she was blowing dog whistles,
repeatedly invoking constitutional originalism and the Tenth Amendment, those hardy
perennial symbols of the Tea Party's desire to return domestic governance to the size and
power they maintained during the Coolidge Administration." Ed Kilgore, Sharron Angle's
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Republicans' social conservative base, it has signaled hostility to abortion
rights, gay rights, and strict church-state separation. For the general public,
professing fidelity to what is actually written in the Constitution, like any legal
document, and what the people who drafted or ratified it thought those words
meant, just seems like an innocuous verity-a plank from the civics class canon
noted above. To declare oneself against such a common-sense approach to
interpreting the Constitution comes across as validating that liberals or
progressives want judges who will make up the law as they go along, just as
conservatives say they do. But that is not because ordinary people subscribe to
originalist philosophy in any of its versions.
Furthermore, Americans regard their Constitution not simply as law in the
sense that a statute or a judicial decision is law. They revere the Constitution as
the sacred text of the nation's secular faith. Despite the fact that constitutional
lawyers, law-teachers, and students focus on the decisions interpreting the
Constitution in a fashion that resembles common law decision making, as far as
the rest of the nation is concerned, "The Constitution" is The Document itself.
As Professor Tribe has noted, "The frequently voiced observation that the
Constitution is America's 'civil religion'-its one unifying, if recognizably
imperfect, scripture-appears to address the written text and what ordinary
citizens might make of it more than the gloss that generations ofjudicial rulings
have placed on it."' 164 In the same vein, constitutional historian Jack Rakove
recently observed, "What's uniquely enduring about the document is how
deeply Americans are wedded to it." He added, "The idea of having a written
constitution as the original supreme fundamental source of law was an
American invention .... [Now] [w]e're very reluctant to amend it. The idea of
rethinking decisions made in 1787 scares some of us to death. '165
Enthusiastically embracing-instead of deriding-Americans' investment
in their sacred text and its framers should hardly require progressives to grit
their teeth. On the contrary, progressives are among those who-with good
reason-have been most fearful of spasmodic drives over the past few decades
for major constitutional amendments or, worse, the calling of a constitutional
convention. 166 And with good reason. It is hardly likely that such a convention
Self-Parody vs. Harry Reid's Missed Chances, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2010, 10:56 PM),
http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/78411/harry-reids-missed-chances.
164 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 17 (emphasis added). He adds,
"[N]ot many people [other than constitutional law professionals] would confuse the Supreme
Court's sequence of pronouncements on constitutional matters with 'The' Constitution." Id.
165 Interview by Ever Gerber with Jack Rakove, supra note 42.
166The history-reflecting the pattern of controversial conservative amendments
opposed by progressives-is recounted in James Rogers, Note, The Other Way to Amend the
Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment Process, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1005, 1009 (2007), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/
orgs/jlpp/Vol30_No3_Rogersonline.pdf. In the 1960s, state governments dominated by rural
districts deprived of power by the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, Baker v.
Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders, and Reynolds v. Sims, pressed hard and at one point had
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could replace the words in the current Constitution with words equally
consonant with progressive values.
Moreover, decades of progressives' inattention to what the Framers wrote,
and the historical record of what they meant, has left the field open to
conservative and libertarian scholars and advocates. Predictably, they have
propagated-unanswered-ludicrous claims that the original understanding
mandated a feckless national government more akin to the Articles of
Confederation the Framers sought to replace than the guarantees of a robust
economy, national security, and individual rights which they carefully designed
into the actual Constitution. 167 Already lost, at least for many years and
decades, are opportunities progressives have squandered by ignoring, and
failing to reinstate into Supreme Court precedent, the original understanding of
the Reconstruction Amendments that the post-Civil War Court cast aside. 168
mobilized thirty-three state applications to Congress, one state shy of the two-thirds majority
required by Article V of the Constitution to compel the calling of a convention by Congress.
A decade later, a similar near-two-thirds majority of states calling for a convention to adopt
a balanced budget amendment provoked a favorable vote for an individual such amendment
in the Senate. Id. at 1009-10.
167 Akhil Amar elaborates in detail the "geostrategic" focus of the Framers, and their
view that a strong central government was a prerequisite to securing all the goals specified in
the Preamble to the Constitution--"Individual and collective liberty, common defense and
domestic tranquility, justice between men and between regions, economic prosperity and
general welfare," AMAR, supra note 37, at 3-54. Max Edling similarly sees the Framers'
priority to create a strong central government to remedy the erstwhile colonies' "most
pressing problem [is] ... the inability of the new Congress to protect either the union's
territorial integrity or its commercial interests." EDLING, supra note 42, at 220. Despite the
similarity of their respective arguments, neither name appears in the other's index.
168 During the 1950s and 1960s, while securing the invalidation of Plessy v. Ferguson's
separate-but-equal emasculation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the upholding of the
Kennedy-Johnson civil rights legislation of the 1960s, progressive legal advocates and
judges declined to replace the raft of post-Civil War decisions, other than Plessy, which
systematically dismantled the three Reconstruction Amendments as written and as their
Framers intended them to be applied. A contrary course could have yielded a compelling
text-and-original meaning basis for progressive positions on most or all of the hot-button
civil rights issues of recent decades: affirmative action; federal protections for violence
against women; congressional authority to prevent private interference with rights created by
the Reconstruction Amendments, not simply "state action"; and congressional authority to
"enforce" the Reconstruction Amendments consonant with its fulsome authority to secure
other constitutional powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g., Balkin, supra
note 40; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 507-08 (2001); Eric Schnapper,
Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV.
753 (1985); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John
Bingham 's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717 (2003); Michael E. Levine, Note,
The Strange Career of "State Action" Under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448
(1965); David Gans & Doug Kendall, The Shield of National Protection: The Text and
History of Section 5 of The Fourteenth Amendment, CONST. ACcOUNTABILITY CTR. (2009),
http://www.theusconstitution.org/upload/fck/file/File_storage/CAC Shield of NationalPro
tection.pdf; Nathan Newman & J.J. Gass, A New Birth of Freedom: The Forgotten History of
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Progressives have a compelling-and accurate-constitutional narrative to tell,
and they should welcome the opportunity to share it. As Dawn Johnsen has
written, "Progressives should emphasize, far more than they typically do, their
fidelity to constitutional text and structure, and that they, no less than
conservatives, seek to give meaning to the words and design of that great
document."'169 E.J. Dionne shows the way in his 2011 Independence Day
Washington Post column, demolishing Texas Governor Rick Perry's counter-
factual sound bite that the Framers intended the national government to be a
mere "agent for the states:" "No," Dionne says, "our Constitution begins with
the words 'We the People' not 'We the States.' The Constitution's Preamble
speaks of promoting 'a more perfect Union,' 'Justice,' 'the common defense,'
'the general Welfare' and 'the Blessings of Liberty.' These were national
goals."170
Instead of vainly flailing at "originalism," progressive advocates (and
judges and politicians) should be taking Dionne's tack: exploiting the wealth of
opportunities presented by the text and history of the Constitution to validate
both their general commitment to the document, and its progressive character;
targeting specific issues; and grounding their arguments in constitutional text
and history wherever appropriate. Given conservatives' appetite for expanding
their constitutional agenda to support their political and policy agendas, the list
of critical issues on which rigorous, good-faith text-and-history analysis should
embarrass them and favor progressives, already long, can only grow.
In general, progressives should be positioning themselves as the true
keepers of the constitutional flame, in contrast with politically driven activists
bent on restoring a pre-New Deal regime that respects neither the needs of
ordinary people nor legal text, history, or precedent. In the 1980s, when even
most Republican appointees to the federal courts endorsed strong congressional
domestic regulatory authority and effective judicial protection for civil rights
and liberties, it may or may not have made sense for progressives to flaunt
indifference to the document's words and original meaning, as some
progressives did, however inadvertently. 17 1 But it hardly makes strategic sense
now, when many federal circuits, and, especially, the Supreme Court, are
the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 1, 2004),
http://brennan.3cdn.net/a8927140bc5b1483e7_fxm6b98kl .pdf.
169 Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the
Twenty-First Century, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 239, 252 (2007).
170 E.J. Dionne Jr., Op-Ed., Duel over a Declaration, WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, at A 15.
171 This habit has not entirely disappeared. For example, University of Virginia Law
Professor Christopher Jon Sprigman, writing in Slate in February 2011, could not suppress
this extravagant condescension: "Blame the Founding Fathers. And blame us for our absurd
fetishization of them and the increasingly time-worn document they created. Because we're
determined to run a post-industrial democracy by reference to a vague, terse, pre-industrial
Constitution, we get judicial opinions that read like political arguments." Christopher Jon
Sprigman, First Do No Harm: Why Judges Should Butt Out of the Fight over Health Care
Reform, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2284664/.
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dominated by hard-line conservatives-in reality, on a broadening array of
issues, unabashed reactionaries. As Justice Stevens famously observed, without
exception, the Republican appointees to the current Supreme Court stand to the
right of all members of the Court to which he was appointed. 172 They have the
power, or the lions' share of it. Progressives need to be holding fast to The Law.
If one wants a glimpse of what an early twenty-first century living constitution
would look like, read Citizens United or the decisions of movement
conservative District Judges Henry Hudson and Roger Vinson nullifying two
centuries of Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause jurisprudence
en route to invalidating the ACA individual mandate. 173
To connect with sectors of the electorate outside their own echo chamber,
progressive advocates need not support, oppose, or mention originalism, or any
other jurisprudential "-ism." They need only take care to harmonize their
appeals with the civics class canon noted above. Having a larger constitutional
vision is important in arguing some issues and essential for anchoring particular
positions and establishing priorities. But in my view this does not require
invention. The constitutional vision or visions that progressives need to defend
in the first years of the twenty-first century are already defined; they include, at
least: the common vision of a charter for effective, responsive, and
compassionate national governance prescribed by the Constitution, its
amendments, Chief Justice Marshall's decisions, and the post-New Deal
decisions as qualified by Carolene Products' footnote four; 174 and the vision of
a "New Birth of Freedom" sketched in the Gettysburg Address and set out in
the Reconstruction Amendments. No doubt the list could be expanded. But
progressive advocates do not need their own "ism" to stand up to conservative
originalism.
In academic fora, there is of course nothing inappropriate about continuing
to chew over the increasingly granular issues about originalism in its various
forms and political flavors. But from the standpoint of promoting public
acceptance of progressive constitutionalism, progressive academics could more
productively invest in enriching the growing body of scholarship that
documents the design of the Framers of the Declaration of Independence, the
1789 Constitution, and its subsequent amendments, to create an enduring
charter for effective, responsive, and compassionate governance.
172 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 803 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court I joined in
1975 would have agreed with today's decision.").
173 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256
(N.D. Fla. 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va.
2010). For detail on how these decisions nullify interpretations of the Commerce, General
Welfare (tax-and-spend), Necessary and Proper, and Due Process Clauses, see, among many
other sources, Lazarus, supra note 14, at 11-20.
174 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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3. Demonstrate the Drastic Consequences of Constitutional Retreat
Embracing the civics class canon will give progressive advocates an idiom
intelligible to real-world audiences. But it won't make the sale. To do that,
progressives must prove that the war over the courts and the Constitution
matters-to those audiences, not just themselves. They will have to demonstrate
the common interests and ideals that will be lost if a conservative activist
judiciary rewrites the Constitution and laws to, for example, put affordable
health care beyond the reach of people with cancer or high blood pressure, leave
the nation's democratic institutions defenseless against inundation by corporate
cash, or dismantle the network constructed during the twentieth century of
essential statutory protections for consumers, workers, retirees, minorities,
women, people with disabilities, people living in and trying to surmount
poverty, and the environment.
This is a challenge shared by all progressives, not just those whose primary
concern is the courts. As made clear by the ACA legal challenges and the Tea
Party's broader drive to demonize and eviscerate government, a new imperative
for progressives is to regenerate public appreciation for the social contract
underlying post-New Deal interpretation of the Constitution. Court-focused
progressives have significant value to add to this enterprise. Fights over broad
Congressional authority to implement the post-New Deal social contract, and
for faithful judicial enforcement of specific laws exercising that authority,
provide unique platforms for reselling the hard-won legal protections that have
for decades been taken for granted, as well as the constitutional regime that
made it possible to enact those protections.
These battles must be fought simultaneously in the media, in legislatures,
and elections, as well as in the courts. When, minutes after President Obama
signed the health reform law, fourteen (now twenty-seven) Republican state
attorneys general and governors asked federal courts in Florida and Virginia to
declare the law's mandatory insurance requirement unconstitutional, even
conservative legal experts scoffed. Reagan Administration Solicitor General and
Harvard law professor Charles Fried called the attacks legally
"preposterous." 175 George Washington University professor Orin Kerr, who
counseled Texas Republican Senator John Comyn on Justice Sonia
Sotomayor's confirmation proceedings in 2009, gave challengers a "less than 1
percent chance" of success. 176 Opponents responded massively in media and
political arenas as well as the courts. They did not frontally challenge the nearly
1751n discussing the ACA lawsuits, Fried stated: "Anybody who proposes something
like this is either ignorant-I mean, deeply ignorant--or just grandstanding in a preposterous
way." 'This Week' Transcript: WH Sr. Advisor Valerie Jarret, ABC THIS WEEK (Mar. 28,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-wh-sr-adviser-valerie-jarrett/story?
id=10210079&page=5.
176 See Simon Lazarus, Op-Ed., Framing the Debate over Health Reform, NEWSWEEK
(Oct. 4, 2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/10/04/opinion-
conservatives-mislead-in-health-debate.html.
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unanimous expert verdict that the reform law's "individual mandate" to
purchase insurance passes muster with governing Supreme Court precedent.
Instead, they have aimed at sowing doubt about whether, if indeed the experts
are right about constitutional law as it stands, perhaps existing law gives the
federal government too much power. Toward this end, opponents have honed a
set of core buzz-words and messages, designed to reframe the debate, and
gradually shift the political and legal consensus. Over and over, in all fora,
ACA opponents have fired off the same talking points: that the individual
mandate is an "unprecedented" and drastic curtailment of individual liberty; that
it uniquely regulates "inactivity," as opposed to "activity"-the "doing of
nothing at all;" and that it "compels" people to "buy a commercial product,"
hence putting the law on a slippery slope and empowering Congress to require
all Americans to buy General Motors cars, nutritious vegetables ("broccoli"), or
health club subscriptions. This parade of horribles, repeated endlessly by
conservative bloggers, editorial writers, and politicians, pop up verbatim in the
briefs of ACA challengers and the opinions of the judges who have ruled
against the mandate.
As of this writing, just one Republican judicial appointee, Sixth Circuit
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, has rejected opponents' message points and their
invitation to replace existing law with their libertarian model. Voting with
Jimmy Carter-appointee Judge Boyce Martin to uphold the mandate, Sutton
recognized that "existing precedents support the government," observing that
only the Supreme Court could overturn or revise those precedents. 177 By the
time the ACA challenges reach the Supreme Court, reform opponents hope their
propaganda network will have so saturated public discourse that the
conservative justices will feel empowered, perhaps pressured, to reject Judge
177 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 555 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part). For a summary of how thoroughly Judge Sutton dissected the message
fabric ACA opponents developed to offset the weakness of the case under existing law, see
Simon Lazarus, Potent Support for the Affordable Care Act Mandate from an Improbable
Source, AM. CONST. SoC'y BLOG (June 30, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/potent-
support-for-the-affordable-care-act-mandate-from-an-improbable-source. In addition to
George W. Bush-appointee Sutton in the Sixth Circuit, in the Eleventh Circuit ACA
litigation, Judge Stanley Marcus, who received his appellate appointment from Democratic
President Bill Clinton but who had previously served as a district judge as a result of an
appointment by Republican President Ronald Reagan, also voted to uphold the mandate on
the basis of reasoning similar to Sutton's. See Florida ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1330 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Two other prominent Republican members of the District of Columbia Circuit,
Judge Brett Kavanaugh and Senior Judge Lawrence Silberman, appeared skeptical of major
elements of the ACA opponents' libertarian catechism during oral argument the ACA
challenge pending in that circuit. See Simon Lazarus, In Under-Reported D.C. Circuit Oral
Argument, Prominent Republican Judges Suggest Novel Arguments for Upholding Health
Care Law's Individual Mandate, AM. CONST. Soc'Y BLOG (Sept. 26, 2011),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/in-under-reported-dc-circuit-oral-argument-prominent-
republican-judges-suggest-novel-argumen.
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Sutton's fidelity to precedent, along with his admonition that "the policy
strengths and weaknesses of... the individual mandate as part of this national
legislation... [should be resolved by the] peoples' political representatives,
rather than their judges."l7 8
Progressives are unlikely to beat conservatives' full court press, unless they
effectively counter it. At this point, it is by no means certain that they will. The
Obama Administration and its allies do appear to have convinced a majority of
the public that specific features of the ACA are valuable, such, for example, as
the law's insurance reforms that will, as of 2014, forbid insurers from rejecting
or charging applicants on the basis of their health status or, specifically, pre-
existing medical conditions. But they have not been able to-indeed, have not
devoted significant resources to attempting to--demonstrate that preserving the
mandate is essential for preserving pre-existing conditions protection.' 79
In sum, in this period, with longstanding fundamental requisites of
progressive constitutionalism and progressive governance at grave risk, Justice
Breyer's emphasis on stressing practical "consequences" in constitutional and
statutory interpretation, is not an option for progressives. It is indispensable.
Such arguments must be deployed on all fronts-politics, the media, as well as
the courts. They must be persuasive, coordinated, harmonized, tailored to target
constituencies and audiences, and shaped to fit the respective arenas in which
they are used.
V. CONCLUSION
Progressives should relish this challenge as a historic opportunity. The
"don't-twist-the-law-to-favor-the-big-guy" message can mean that confirmation
battles need no longer be mere annoying distractions from the Democrats' main
agenda of middle-class-friendly economic and environmental reform. The new
message meshes the war over the courts with that agenda, and with the interests
of the constituencies it targets, while sounding in broadly resonant rule of law
tones. Conservatives' new drive to reprise Lochner-style activism, and many of
the specific claims associated with it, open the way for progressives to show
that this transparently political exercise would hijack, not restore, the
Constitution as written and originally understood, as well as applied during the
past eight decades. The requisite arguments can attract support from moderates
and even traditional conservatives, such as Judge Sutton, 180 former Fourth
178 Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 566 (Sutton, J., concurring in part). The analysis in this
paragraph expands on material from my Newsweek article, Framing the Debate over Health
Reform, supra note 176.
179 States that have attempted to ban exclusions of coverage for people with preexisting
conditions without imposing a minimum coverage provision have been unsuccessful. See
Brief Amici Curiae of the March of Dimes Foundation et al. in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 5-8, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH), 2010 WL 2661291.
180 See Thomas More, 651 F.3d at 549 (Sutton, J., concurring in part).
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Circuit Chief Judge H. Harvie Wilkinson, 181 and Judges Alex Kozinski and
Michael Boudin. 182 And the practical issues at stake affect the most basic,
highest priority needs of virtually all Americans, including many who have long
overlooked their stake in courts that ensure government's continued capacity to
meet those needs.
181 See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REv. 253, 254 (2009) (condemning District of Columbia v. Heller and Roe v.
Wade as equally driven by political agendas rather than applicable constitutional text,
history, and precedent); see also Text, History & Principle: What Our Constitution Means
and How to Interpret It, AM. CONST. SOC'Y (June 18, 2011),
http://www.acstaw.org/news/video/text-history-principle-what-our-constitution-means-and-
how-to-interpret-it.
182 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,426 F.3d 1162, 1194
(9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, at 27-
29 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring).
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